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KNOWN UNKNOWNS: 
THE DELUSION OF TERRORISM INSURANCE
Michelle E. Boardman
“As we know, there known knowns; there are things we know we know.  We also 
know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we 
do not know.  But there are also unknown unknowns – the ones we don’t know we 
don’t know.”1
U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
Winner of the British Plain English Campaign’s “Foot in the Mouth” Award 
INTRODUCTION
The September 11 terrorist attacks shifted the risk category of 
international terrorism in the United States from a risk ignored to a risk 
apparent.  Before the attacks, the abstract possibility of a terrorist event 
within the United States was known but dismissed by most.  The risk fell 
into the category of “silent” risk, either so unlikely so as to be ignored by
both insurer and insured, or so incalculable as to be outside of the realm of 
insurable risks.  After the attacks, the expectation of international terrorism 
on American soil changed dramatically; unfortunately, the sudden 
awareness of a risk does not automatically trigger the sudden insurability of 
that risk.
After the attacks, insurers were quick to reassure the public that the 
industry could pay for the largest insured loss in history.  Nearly as quickly, 
insurers began preparations to exclude future terrorism attacks from 
coverage.  As the states began approving the use of these policy exclusions, 
Congress enacted a program barring terrorism exclusions, in exchange for
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1 Donald Rumsfeld, quoted in Phillip Stephens, The Unwitting Wisdom of 
Rumsfeld’s Unknowns, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2003, at 19.  
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federal funds for catastrophic losses.  Today, commercial insurers must 
either offer terrorism insurance, or leave the market.2
This article makes two contentions.  In short, the American 
terrorism risk is not covered today, and cannot be covered tomorrow.  First, 
a significant percentage of losses from future terrorist attacks will not be 
covered under existing policy language, with or without the addition of a 
terrorism exclusion.  Numerous other exclusions, common to commercial 
policies, bar losses from most potential forms of terrorist attack.  These 
include losses from nuclear bombs, radiation from dirty bombs, and 
chemical or biological attacks.  In this way, the terrorism risk is scantily 
clad, barely covering more than ordinary explosive damage.
Second, in the absence of meaningful actuarial data on the risk of 
international terrorism in the United States, insurance coverage is not 
possible.  Not all risks are insurable.  The risk of terrorism in the United 
States has two characteristics that call its insurability into serious question.  
First, the risk as we now know it is fundamentally incalculable; we simply 
do not have the actuarial data to calculate the likelihood, nature, or extent of 
the risk.  The history of the war exclusion reveals that a risk that cannot be 
calculated meaningfully cannot be insured.  “[I]n the pragmatic 
mathematical realm of the actuary, both war and international terrorism now 
represent incalculable risks capable of rendering key elements of the 
insurance industry insolvent.”3
Equally relevant, the risk may be too correlated or catastrophic for 
effective risk pooling.4  A nuclear attack or a tidal wave, for instance, is not 
insurable because such widespread, expensive losses compromise the value 
of risk pooling across geography and policyholder type.5 Unconstrained by 
government mandate, insurers do not find it profitable to insure risks from 
such potential “clash events.”  A clash event is best defined as a catastrophic 
2
 This article focuses on the principal, high-dollar realm of commercial property and 
liability insurance, leaving aside individual property insurance, and health and life 
insurance.  
3
 Jane Kendall, The Incalculable Risk: How the World Trade Center Disaster 
Accelerated the Evolution of Insurance Terrorism Exclusions, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev 
569 (May 2002) (examining the common “war exclusion” in the context of 
terrorism).
4
 Risk pooling allows insurers to offset risks against one another, resulting in more 
even and predictable loss.  By grouping large numbers of similarly situated 
policyholders together, insurers create “a greater likelihood that the favorable and 
the harmful experiences will tend to be balanced” for any given time and spread out 
over time.  Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, INSURANCE LAW § 1.3 (1988 ed.).
5 See, e.g., nuclear exclusion clauses, infra, at __.
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event that causes significant losses across multiple “lines” of insurance.  The 
World Trade Center attack, for example, caused great loss in the lines of 
property insurance, liability insurance, and life insurance, among others.  
For cataclysmic losses that occur irregularly, like terrorist attacks, clash 
events cause a breakdown in the reinsurance system at the precise moment 
that reinsurance is necessary.  Insurance industry representatives have 
already stated that insurers and their reinsurers cannot financially absorb 
another hit like September 11.
Nonetheless, the federal and state governments will find a way to 
compensate those who suffer losses from future acts of international 
terrorism in the United States.  The non-insurance payout, by insurance 
companies, of government-mandated (and possibly subsidized) funds to 
victims of future attacks is self-evidently possible, but not self-evidently 
desirable.  Two questions about this compensation system should be asked.  
First, will it, or can it, be a system of insurance, and not merely entitlement?  
Second, if genuine insurance is not possible, should government continue to 
use insurers as the conduit through which to collect and disperse 
compensation?
Of the few who have addressed the force of terrorism on the 
insurance market, most start from the implicit premise that the existence of 
terrorism insurance is a logistical given.6  The remainder speculate, contrary 
to the conclusion of this article, that terrorism insurance is feasible in the 
United States today.  For example, in a short symposium piece, Anne Gron 
and Alan Sykes argue persuasively that the government will inevitably 
expend funds on rebuilding and compensation for future terrorist attacks, 
whether or not the funds are collected through premiums that are nominally 
6 See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Note, Insuring Against Terror?, 112 YALE L.J. 2509 
(2003) (public choice analysis of TRIA, concluding that government as reinsurer 
counters rent seeking present under government as direct insurer).  Other articles on 
the general topic include Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of 
September 11: Myriad Claims, Multiple Lines, Arguments Over Occurrence 
Counting, War Risk Exclusions, The Future of Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues 
of Government Role, 37 TORT & INS. L.J. 817 (2002) (pre-TRIA analysis of many 
insurance issues surrounding the 9/11 attacks, including World Trade Center 
insurance fight and the war risk exclusion); Comment, The Incalculable Risk: How 
the World Trade Center Disaster Accelerated the Evolution of Insurance Terrorism 
Exclusions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 569 (2002) (examining the common “war 
exclusion” in the context of terrorism); and Richard Allyn & Heather McNeff, The 
Fall and Rise of Terrorism Insurance Coverage Since September 11, 29 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REV. 821 (2003) (providing a concise description of the immediate 
market effect of 9/11 and the structure of TRIA).
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set apart from general revenue.7  Perhaps because it is not the focus of the 
piece, Gron and Sykes assume that genuine terrorism insurance will be 
available for all but the most devastating attacks.  
Similarly, in a symposium piece written before the current federal 
involvement, expert Robert Jerry argues that because natural disasters can 
be as catastrophic as a terrorist attack, the fundamental nature of the 
insurance industry did not change after 9/11.8  While acknowledging some 
of the “obvious differences” between natural disasters and intentional 
terrorist attacks, Jerry states that “it might be argued that there is no obvious 
reason why pricing models for terrorism coverage cannot be developed.  For 
example, the FBI keeps statistical records on terrorist events, both at home 
and aboard, and this data set might be an appropriate starting point for the 
development of a pricing model.”9  While the sheer possibility of using 
actuarial data for the terrorism risk exists, the possibility will only be 
realized if terrorist attacks become much more frequent, as this article 
demonstrates.10  Jerry tentatively concludes that federal participation in the 
terrorism insurance market is both possible and desirable.11
This article proves that terrorism insurance is not possible.  The 
terrorism risk is a known unknown; we are aware of the risk but are still too 
ignorant to calculate and redistribute the risk in an insurance pool.  Even if
the definition of insurance were distorted to encompass the current program, 
federal involvement in “terrorism insurance” will mislead the public about 
the risks we face, and crowd out the future development of limited, but 
genuine, terrorism insurance.
After providing a brief history of the insurance industry’s attempt to 
exit the terrorism market, and the federal government’s attempt to compel a 
market, Section I examines the strong limitations on insurance coverage that 
persist; losses from nuclear, biological, chemical, Internet, and utility attacks 
are often without coverage.  
7
 Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the 
Government as Insurer?, 36 IND. L. REV. 447, 462-463 (2003).
8
 Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Terrorism, and 9/11: Reflections on Three 
Threshold Questions, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. 95, 103 (2002) (“Although it is fair to 
claim that the upper boundary of possible loss from terrorism changes on 9/11, it is 
also correct to assert that before 9/11 insurers contemplated and anticipated single-
day or single-event losses on the scale of those suffered on 9/11.”).
9 Id. at 113.
10 See the discussion, infra, at __.
11
 Jerry, Insurance, Terrorism and 9/11, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. at 119-120.
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Section II considers possible interpretations of the terrorism 
insurance market immediately following 9/11 and what that market forecasts 
for future terrorism insurance.  This section also explains why the many 
insurance companies that adopted a “terrorism exclusion” after 9/11 were 
later in favor of government intervention in the terrorism insurance market, 
even though intervention voided terrorism exclusions.
The difference between insurance and “mere money” in the form of 
government aid is analyzed in Section III.  The inability to calculate the 
terrorism risk or create an appropriate risk pool explains the inability to 
provide genuine insurance today, in Section IV.  Terrorism insurance is 
judged against the traditional catastrophic risks caused by natural disasters
and war in Section V.  Neither the analytical comparisons nor the histories 
of catastrophic risks in the United States support the hope for serious-risk
terrorism insurance in the near future.  
Finally, Section VI explains why it is not better to just pretend with 
terrorism “insurance” than to adopt a straightforward government aid policy.  
While the federal program provides none of the unique benefits of 
insurance, it does send artificially low precautionary incentives to 
policyholders and exacerbates moral hazard.  Both of these could lead to an
increase in effective terrorism.  What is more, government “insurance” runs 
a strong risk of crowding out the potential future market for minor or 
moderate risks. In short, pretending to insure against terrorism today 
decreases the chance for true insurance in the future.
A BRIEF HISTORY
Before 9/11, insurers “considered the risk so low that they did not 
identify or price potential losses from terrorism activity separately from the 
general property and liability coverage provided to businesses.”12  After 
9/11, the risk was considered too high, too volatile, and too uncertain to be 
priced.  “Insurers pointed out that experience with major terrorist events has 
been so limited, and the potential losses so large, that setting an actuarially 
sound price for such coverage is virtually impossible.”13  Because a range of 
scholars and many in Congress reject this position, this article’s conclusion 
is contentious.14
12
 Richard J. Hillman, Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to Attacks 
Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
at 3 (2002).
13 Id. at 3.
14 See Section ##, infra. 
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Reinsurers pulled out of the terrorism risk market first.15  Reinsurers 
insure insurers, to give a simple definition to a highly complex international 
market.  Reinsurance allows primary insurers to diversify their own risks, 
and to take on potential catastrophic risks that could otherwise lead to 
insolvency.  “Such diversification may include protection against 
unexpected frequency of losses, unexpected severity, or both.”16 A prime 
example is 9/11, for which reinsurers are expected to pay about two-thirds 
of the final insured cost.17
Without the ability to rely on reinsurers in the face of another 
catastrophe, and with little sense of how to begin to think about pricing the 
newly recognized terrorism risk, insurers fled those areas of the market most 
likely to want or need terrorism coverage.18 Indeed, nearly every insurer 
inserted into all existing and future policies a “terrorism exclusion” clause
that excluded coverage for loss from foreign terrorist attacks on American 
soil19 The commercial concerns of the country were not insured against 
terrorism.
In response, the federal government mandated the provision of 
terrorism insurance under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, or TRIA.20
15 See Jackie Spinner, Terrorism-Insurance Battle Looms; Senate Rejects GOP Plan 
to Limit Damages, WASH. POST, June 14, 2002, at E02.  Because reinsurers are not 
regulated by the states, and reinsurance contracts tend to end on the calendar year, 
reinsurers were able to pullout of the terrorism risk market much faster than primary 
insurers, leaving insurers relatively unprotected from insolvency.  See discussion, 
infra at __.
16
 Kenneth S. Abraham, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION at 638 (“By 
diversifying risk through the purchase of reinsurance, an insurer also can increase 
its underwriting capacity, since the reserves it must maintain to cover potential 
losses are reduced.”).
17 See Hillman, Terrorism Insurance, U.S. GAO at 8.
18
 “Low and medium risks, particularly in industries or geographic locations where 
there is little perceived exposure to a terrorist event, [were] the least affected.  
However, large companies, businesses of any size perceived to be in or near a target 
location, or those with some concentration of personnel or facilities [were] unlikely 
to be able to obtain a meaningful level of terrorism coverage at an economically 
viable price.”  Hillman, Terrorism Insurance, U.S. GAO at 4.
19 See the detailed discussion of the terrorism exclusion, infra, at __.
20 After September 11, the U.S. Congress considered several potential methods of 
ensuring the availability of terrorism insurance through governmental support.  The 
House passed the Terrorism Risk Protection Act, which followed the British model 
of providing extensive federal funding for losses exceeding $1 billion per 
occurrence, as determined by the Treasure Department.  H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. 
(2001).  This Act included provisions for reimbursement by the insurance industry 
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The Act has two separate arms: the mandatory participation arm and the 
compensation arm.21  The participation arm mandates that insurers issuing 
commercial property and casualty insurance offer terrorism insurance to 
their policyholders.  Insurers must give notice of the offer.  Whether the
offer is accepted or not, the Act made void any terrorism exclusions already 
in place.22 To give the mandate teeth, the Act directs insurers to provide 
coverage in keeping with the rest of the policy, meaning that attempts to 
eviscerate coverage with high deductibles and low caps would violate the 
Act.23
Of course, neither the States nor the federal government can require
an insurer to provide a certain type of coverage as an absolute matter.24
State governments can, and often do, however, mandate that particular 
coverage be provided as a condition to the provision of other insurance 
within that state.  Because a government cannot similarly mandate that such 
insurance be profitable, insurers do occasionally exit a jurisdiction or 
insurance market in lieu of providing the required coverage.  Insurers had 
threatened to take leave of D.C., for example, if the Insurance 
Commissioner had not reconsidered the District’s proposed terrorism 
coverage structure.25
to the government for funds expended.  The Senate did not pass this Act, but did 
consider a version that would have required insurers to bear the first $10 billion of
coverage, followed by 90% federal funding, without a repayment provision.  See 
147 Cong. Rec. S12258 (daily ed. Nov. 30 2001) (statement of Sen. Gramm).  
Neither version became law, but if either had, the law would have sunset in two 
years unless Congress extended the program by additional legislation.
21
 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 
(2002).  See also Department of the Treasury Terrorism Risk Insurance Program 
Final Rule, 31 C.F.R. § 50 (2003) (regulations implementing and explaining TRIA). 
22 Of course, if a policyholder declines terrorism coverage for a new policy year, 
terrorism losses are excluded in that policy.
23
 Relevant insurers “shall make available . . . coverage for insured losses that does 
not differ materially from the terms, amounts, and other coverage limitations 
applicable to losses arising from events other than acts of terrorism.”  
TRIA § 103(c).
24
 At least, governments can’t require coverage indefinitely.  States have, rarely, 
prevented insurers from leaving a market for a period of time.  
25 See Meg Fletcher, Regulators, ISO work out lower terrorism loss costs, 37:7 BUS. 
INS., Feb. 17, 2003.  D.C. Insurance Commissioner Larry Mirel called initial 
estimates for terrorism coverage in D.C. “off the wall.”  Id.  The ISO eventually 
agreed that in New York and Washington, it would “lower loss costs and [] cap the 
maximum cost of terrorism coverage at 25% of premiums for property insurance 
alone.”  Id.
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TRIA provides an incentive to insurers to stay in the game: the 
compensation arm provides money from the federal government, to insurers, 
for the payment of terrorism losses.  The percentage paid by insurers 
increases each year of the three-year program.  Below a total nationwide 
loss of $5 million for a terrorist attack, insurers pay for all insured losses.  
Above $5 million, insurers pay a deductible based on their premiums.26
Above the deductible, insurers pay co-insurance of 10 percent.  The federal 
government therefore pays 90 percent of annual losses above the insurer 
deductible.  Above $100 billion, neither the government nor insurers must 
pay anything.  The government might choose to pay more, of course, 
depending on the political climate and government priorities after such a 
massive attack.
Before the compensation arm of TRIA kicks in, an attack must be 
certified as an “act of terrorism” by the Secretaries of Treasury and State, 
along with the Attorney General.27  Certification cannot be given if “the act 
is committed as part of the course of a [declared] war.”28  Nor can it be 
given if the combined property/casualty insurance losses do not exceed $5 
million.29  The public may be surprised to learn that a car bomb killing ten 
and destroying a federal building does not count as “an act of terrorism” for 
federal compensation purposes.  On the other hand, the public may not care; 
as long as the mandatory coverage provision of TRIA is in place, insurers 
will have to indemnify property owners for such losses even without federal 
backup funds.  
While policyholders are free to reject terrorism coverage and its 
additional premium, policyholders cannot opt out of the Act’s recoupment 
process if it is used.  TRIA provides both for mandatory and discretionary 
“recoupment,” which would repay the federal government through 
26
 For 2003, 2004, and 2005, the deductible will be a percentage of direct earned 
premiums  7, 10, and 15 percent, respectively.
27
 TRIA § 102(1)(A).  Certification requires “an act of terrorism” that is “a violent 
act or an act that is dangerous to” “human life,” “property,” or “infrastructure,” 
resulting “in damage within the United States,” with some mobile military 
exceptions.  Id.  The act must also “have been committed by an individual or 
individuals acting on behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an 
effort to coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the policy 
or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion.”  Id. 
§ 102(1)(A)(iv).  
28
 TRIA § 102(1)(B)(i).  It is not entirely clear how this first restriction would be 
applied, but as the United States last declared war in World War II, the question is 
unlikely to be asked.  
29 Id. § 101(1)(B)(ii).
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surcharges on policyholders.30 Mandatory recoupment is calculated as the 
difference between what the industry pays out for terrorism losses and $10 
billion in 2003, $12.5 billion in 2004, and $15 billion in 2005.
The Act only has a few years left.  The mandatory coverage portion 
of TRIA would sunsets at the end of 2004, if the Secretary of the Treasury 
did not extend the program for one additional year, as is expected.31  The 
compensation arm sunsets at the end of 2005; if mandatory compensation 
coverage lapses first, federal compensation will only be made available to 
those insurers who provide coverage for certified terrorism losses.  Once the
Act sunsets, Congress will be faced with how, if at all, the federal 
government should continue to be involved in terrorism insurance.  This 
article seeks to inform that decision.
I. THE GHOSTS OF COVERAGE PAST: MANY TERRORIST ACTS WERE 
UNINSURED BEFORE 9/11, AND REMAIN UNINSURED TODAY
To hear the media tell it, or to hear Congress debate it, the dispute 
over whether to allow terrorism exclusions is a dispute over allowing a 
fundamental change in insurance coverage.  In fact, many forms of terrorist 
attack were not covered by insurance before 9/11, and remain uncovered 
today.  The role of terrorism exclusions is therefore at most a battle in the 
war over terrorism insurance; it is not the war itself.  The current federal 
program does bar terrorism exclusions, but this is a far cry from mandating 
full terrorism coverage.
Even sophisticated scholars open an analysis of terrorism insurance 
by noting that most property losses incurred on 9/11 were covered by 
insurance because standard American property policies did not contain a 
terrorism exclusion.32  It is true that if American policies had contained a 
terrorism exclusion similar to those used in many other countries, these 
property losses would not have been covered.  The converse is not true, 
30
 For a though description and public choice analysis of TRIA, see, Jeffrey Manns, 
Note, Insuring Against Terror, 112 Yale L.J. 2509, 2533-2536 (2003).
31 See TRIA, § 3(c)(1)-(2).
32 See, e.g., Levmore, Insuring Against Terrorism at 3 (“[B]y and large the assets 
that were lost, including buildings, aircraft, and office contents, were insured under 
conventional insurance policies that did not (following conventional practice) 
exclude losses from terrorism.”); see also Daniel B. Rubock & Tad Phillip, CMBS: 
Moody’s Approach to Terrorism Insurance for U.S. Commercial Real Estate, 489 
PLI Real Estate 365, 369 (Feb. 2003) (“Because terrorism acts were not specifically 
excluded from all-risk policies before September 11th, damage resulting from such 
acts was covered automatically.”).
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however.  The absence of a terrorism exclusion does not guarantee that 
losses from terrorism were or are covered.  
The structure of insurance policies reveals why; the first modern 
insurance policies were maritime policies, providing coverage for losses 
from “all perils of the sea.”33  Policies providing insurance for non-mobile 
property on land were created by imitating the maritime policies, making the 
necessary alterations to the description of the property.  While the set of 
perils on the sea is a limited universe, only a few exclusions were 
necessary.34 Once insurance policies walked on land, however, it soon 
became clear that the source of damage to property was legion.  Property 
policies gradually drifted away from the “all peril” approach to a form that 
limited coverage by two primary methods.  
First, most policies now define the universe of causes from which 
loss can come; loss caused by unenumerated means is not encompassed by 
the policy.  A policy might cover loss by fire, for example, but not by flood.  
Second, starting from the base of covered causes, pockets of loss are carved 
out by individual “exclusions.”  For example, the standard policy will cover 
destruction of property by explosion, but not if the explosion occurs as part 
of a declared war.35  Within the covered universe  explosions  there is a 
subset of explosions that is excluded — war explosions.  Apart from certain 
procedural requirements of a policy,36 insurers and courts determine whether 
a property loss is covered by first looking to see if the cause falls within the 
33 See Robert H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law, § 13A[a].
34
 In an interesting parallel, as all risk marine policies evolved, some came to 
exclude most of the losses from piracy.  See Dole v. New England Mut. Marine Ins., 
88 Mass. 373, 374 (Mass. 1863) (discussing a policy excluding losses “from 
capture, seizure, detention, or the consequence of any attempt threat; the clause 
herein embodied, touching said perils or adventures, to the contrary 
notwithstanding.”). 
35
 Under the ISO war exclusion, the insurer “will not pay for loss or damage caused 
directly or indirectly by . . . (1) war, including undeclared or civil war; (2) warlike 
action by a military force, including action in hindering or defending against an 
actual or expected attack, by any government, sovereign or other authority using 
military personnel or other agents; or (3) insurrection, rebellion, revolution, usurped 
power, or action taken by governmental authority in hindering or defending any of 
these.”  Insurance Services Office, Cause of Loss Special Form CP1030, 2.
36
 At a minimum, most policies require the policyholder to report the loss within a 
set period of time, to provide the insurer with various proofs of loss, and to 
cooperate with the insurer’s investigation.  
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defined universe, and only then looking to see if an otherwise covered cause 
falls within an excluded subset.37
A. EXCLUSIONS FOR FIRE, NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, AND 
UTILITY DAMAGE
It is this coverage/exclusion policy structure that explains why the 
absence of a terrorism exclusion is insufficient, by itself, to amount to 
coverage for terrorism.  Commercial policies may generally provide 
coverage for property damage, or for liability to others, but non-terrorism 
exclusions abound.  For example, in states that allow it, property insurers 
can choose not to cover loss caused by fire.38 Experts seem to agree that it 
was not the initial impact explosion, but intense fire that caused the 
destruction of the Twin Towers, and therefore most of the New York loss.  
The insurance side of 9/11 could have turned out very differently if New 
York allowed policies to segregate fire loss.39
The battle over whether state insurance commissioners would grant 
insurers permission to use terrorism exclusions created the false impression 
that terrorist attacks were already covered by existing policies.  After all, the 
September 11 losses were covered.  Moreover, because of the salience of 
that attack, the common anticipation of future terrorism within the United 
States is slanted toward large-scale destruction of property and human life 
by explosives.  It was fortunate, but by no means fated, that the September 
11 attacks caused precisely the kind of loss that was most clearly covered by 
then existing commercial policies.  
But future attacks are less likely to be successful hijackings and 
more likely to either be small-scale car bombings or, if large scale, by 
methods that are excluded.  Therefore, other potential forms of terrorist 
attack cannot be overlooked.  Losses arising from an attack involving a 
37
 Ordinarily, the burden of showing a loss is covered under the basic policy falls on 
the policyholder, while the burden of showing that an otherwise covered loss is 
barred by an exclusion falls on the insurer.  See 44A Am. Jur. 2d Insurance §§
1962, 1965 (2003).  
38
 Thirty states require insurers to cover loss from fire damage, whatever the cause.  
See Gregg J. Loubier & Jason B. Aro, Insuring the Risks of Terror: Questions of the 
Cost and Application of Terror Insurance Remain Open, L.A. LAWYER, Sept. 2002, 
at 19. Terrorism exclusions in these states would not effectively bar loss from a 
terrorism-related fire even if the insurer were foolish enough to attempt to do so.  
This common “Standard Fire Policy” is based on a New York policy, often called 
“165 lines,” for the number of lines in the required text of the clause.  New York 
Insurance Law § 3404 (McKinney).
39 See New York Insurance Law § 3404 (McKinney) 
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nuclear explosion, biological or chemical agents, or the use of computer 
networks are all possible, and are quite arguably uninsured.40 Losses from 
fire and “dirty bombs” are also uninsured in certain circumstances.
First, coverage for damage from any kind of nuclear attack, 
including the use of a “dirty bomb,” may be barred by the application of the 
nuclear exclusion, which states that the insurer “will not pay for loss or 
damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . nuclear radiation, or radioactive 
contamination, however caused.”41  The more amusingly drafted “absolute 
nuclear exclusion” bars recovery from “any injury or damage to or arising 
out of any nuclear device, radioactive material, isotope . . . or any other 
chemical element having an atomic number above eighty-three (83) or any 
other material having similar properties of radioactivity.”42 There is little 
question that, for the many policies containing this exclusion, a nuclear 
attack is not covered.43
The exclusion would extend to the radiation caused by “dirty 
bombs,” which are non-fissile radioactive weapons that explode as 
conventional bombs do, but send out radioactive isotopes into the air and 
area of the explosion.  Because damage from the explosion itself should be 
covered, dirty bombs are underinsured, not uninsured, risks.  
In contrast, “clean” nuclear bombs may be twice excluded: once by 
the nuclear exclusion, and once by the “electrical damage exclusion.”
Unlike dirty bombs, nuclear bombs also emit an electromagnetic pulse 
40
 How a court would choose to apply the exclusions that remove coverage from 
these losses in another question.  Insurers bear the burden of proving the 
interpretation and application of coverage exclusions, and any ambiguity will be 
construed against the insurer.  In addition, language may be construed with the 
policyholder’s expectation of coverage in mind.
41
 Insurance Services Office, Causes of Loss Special Form CP1030, 1 (or ISO Form 
CP 10 30 10 91 (B)(1)(d) (1990)).  
42
 Reprinted in Constitution State Ins. Co. v. ISO-TEX, Inc., 61 F.3d 405, 408 (5th 
Cir. 1995).  
43
 The standard “all risk” commercial policy contains this exclusion, so it is quite 
common.  See, e.g., Mark E. Miller, How TRIA is implemented key to its scope; 
Cover for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attack must be ensured, 
38:3 BUS. INS., Jan. 19, 2004. (“most policies contain broadly worded boilerplate 
nuclear, biological, chemical and environmental exclusions”); David Pilla, Swiss 
Reinsurance Warns of Flaws in Nuclear Exclusion Language, BEST’S INS. NEWS, 
Nov. 14, 2003 (critiquing a “widely used” form of nuclear exclusion).  See also, 
Practicing Law Institute, Introduction to The Comprehensive General Liability 
(CGL) Policy, 658 PLI/Comm 7 (May-June, 1993)
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capable of doing great damage.44 The electromagnetic pulse consists of 
charged particles, moving at the speed of light, that travel along wires and 
other conductors, destroying the physical wiring and the electronic 
equipment attached to the system.  This type of damage is excluded by 
policies containing the “electrical damage exclusion,” a common form of 
which states that the insurer “will not pay for loss or damage caused by or 
resulting from . . . artificially generated electric current, including electric 
arching, that disturbs electrical devices, appliances, or wires.”45 Taken 
together, this exclusion and the nuclear exclusion carve out coverage for the 
immediate and residual radiation of a nuclear bomb, the force of the 
explosion and heat damage, and electromagnetic pulse destruction.
Second, of great concern to many businesses will be the exclusions 
in ordinary property policies of loss from utility failures and utility service 
interruptions.  A standard utility services exclusion states that the insurer 
“will not pay for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by . . . the 
following”: “The failure of power or other utility service supplied to the 
described premises, however caused, if the failure occurs away from the 
described premises.”46 This excludes loss whether terrorists bring down a 
utility by computer hacking, an electromagnetic pulse, or direct physical 
destruction.  The government and experts agree that the probability and 
potential severity of this type of attack are high.
Third, coverage for losses or liability caused by a chemical or 
biological agent, released into the atmosphere or a water system, may be 
barred by the ordinary pollution exclusion.47  The pollution exclusion varies 
44 See Walter Pincus, U.S. Explores Developing Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 20, 2003 at A9. 
45
 Insurance Services Office, Causes of Loss Special Form CP1030, 2-4.  See also
Gene Rappe, The Role of Insurance in the Battle Against Terrorism, 12 DEPAUL 
BUS. L.J. 351, 363 (1999) (electrical damage exclusion common); Dave Lenckus, 
Avoiding interrupted coverage; Buyers find business interruption market still tight, 
38:5 BUS. INS., Feb. 2, 2004 (insurers generally reducing coverage for “wide-area 
electrical service disruptions).
46
 Alliance of American Insurers, Insurance Professionals Policy Kit (2001 ed.) at
221, Causes of Loss, Basic Form, No. CP 10 10 06 95 (ISO 1995). “But if the 
failure of power or other utility service results in a Covered Cause of Loss, we will 
pay for the loss or damage caused by that Covered Cause of Loss.”  Id.  “This 
exclusion does not apply to the Business Income coverage or to Extra Expense 
coverage.” Id.
47
 In part because it is a standard feature of Commercial General Liability (CGL) 
policies, “[n]o single exclusion has had more prominence in insurance litigation 
than the pollution exclusion.”  Roger C. Henderson & Robert H. Jerry, II, 
INSURANCE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS at 631.  See also, Randy J. Maniloff, 
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more widely in language, but a representative form excludes coverage “for 
loss or damage caused by or resulting from . . . discharge, seepage, 
migration, release or escape of pollutants” unless caused by several 
specified events.48  The term “pollutant” is defined in each policy, often very 
broadly.  Courts differ in their interpretation of the words “pollutant” and 
“chemical” but anthrax and other potential terrorist agents would likely be 
included.
Finally, apart from the physical damage done to a business, the 
largest hit a commercial entity might take is the interruption of its ordinary 
business practices.49  Business interruption coverage, which can be part of a 
property policy or purchased separately, provides compensation for lost 
profits during a period when the business cannot run or cannot run at full 
capacity.  The length of the compensated “interruption” is limited, but the 
payout can be substantial.  
For example, many businesses in lower Manhattan were interrupted 
for a long period by the destruction of the World Trade Center and the 
governmental shutdown.  These businesses are likely due large amounts on 
their business interruption claims.50  The same may be true for the mall 
contained inside Regan National Airport, which was closed for a month 
after 9/11.  On the other hand, some of these businesses will be denied 
coverage depending on the wording of each business interruption clause; 
many do not provide coverage unless the interruption is a result of physical 
damage to the policyholder’s own property.51
Future interruption claims may become more limited or even 
unavailable.  Business interruption insurance only covers an interruption 
that is caused by an act that itself would be covered.  If a New York 
business must close for two weeks because of fire damage from an attack, 
the lost profits (and certain other expenses) from that two week period will 
be covered.  If a Washington, D.C. business must close for many months 
because of residual nuclear radiation from a dirty bomb, however, the loss 
profits will not be covered because the damage from the bomb itself is not 
Absolute Pollution Exclusion: Drano and The Litigation Clog: Five Reasons Why 
There is No End in Sight to the Litigation, 17 Mealey’s Litigation Report: Insurance 
#32 (June 24, 2003).
48
 Insurance Services Office, Causes of Loss Special Form CP1030, 2-4. 
49 See Patrick A. Gaughan, MEASURING BUSINESS INTERRUPTION LOSSES, (2003).
50 See Sylvia Hsieh, “Business Interruption” Claims Soar in Terrorist Aftermath, 
LAW. WKLY. USA, Oct. 29, 2001, at 1.  
51 See Joseph B. Treaster, After Providing Lift to City Economy, Insurance 
Payments for 9/11 Losses Slow Down, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002 at B7.
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covered.  For the many businesses that are affected indirectly by an attack, 
this limitation on coverage could have strong consequences.
Losses for nuclear attacks, chemical attacks, utility disruption, 
business interruption, and dirty bombs are therefore either uninsured or 
underinsured.  If insurers were not providing coverage for most of the forms 
of loss now anticipated from terrorist attacks before the risk of such attacks 
became clear, they are unlikely to add such coverage now that the potential 
loss is so great, possibly widespread, and impossible to calculate.  In fact, 
new exclusions have already been drafted since the federal terrorism 
insurance program was enacted, to drive home to policyholders the limits of
terrorism coverage.  A representative example is descriptively if laboriously 
titled:  the “Nuclear, Biological or Chemical Terrorism Exclusion (Other 
Than Certified Acts of Terrorism); Cap on Losses From Certified Acts of 
Terrorism.”52  Losses are excluded from “the use, release or escape of 
nuclear materials,” “radiation or radioactive contamination,” and “the 
dispersal or application of pathogenic or poisonous biological or chemical 
materials.”53 Even as some narrowly tailored reinsurance becomes 
available, industry insiders admit that there are “no reinsurance markets for 
terrorism acts involving nuclear, biological, or chemical attacks – the so-
called NBC perils.”54
If the federal government or the states require insurers to provide 
full terrorism insurance, therefore, the circle of compulsory coverage will be 
much larger than the current debate appreciates.  In fact, at least one critic 
has recently argued that TRIA requires insurers to provide coverage for any 
kind of harm, including nuclear or biological, if it is part of a certified
terrorist act.55 Insurers have not read the Act this way, and thus far the 
government has had no call to rule on the issue, but the argument is 
plausible.56
52
 Insurance Services Office, form CU 21 32 12 02 (2002), available at
<<vu.iiaa.net/Docs/Terrorism/CU21321202.pdf>>.  
53 Id.
54 See Jack P. Gibson, Terrorism Insurance Update 2003, IRMI Insights (June 
2003), available at <<hhtp://www.irmi.com/insights/articles/gibson015.asp>> (as of 
Nov. 18, 2003).
55 See Mark E. Miller, How TRIA is implemented key to its scope; Cover for 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attack must be ensured, 38:3 BUS. 
INS., Jan. 19, 2004.  
56
 Under TRIA, insurers “[s]hall make available property and casualty insurance 
coverage for insured losses that does not differ materially from the terms, amounts 
and other coverage limitations applicable to losses arising from events other than 
acts of terrorism.”  TRIA § 103(c).  On the one hand, the prevalence of nuclear, 
biological, chemical, and electrical exclusions in pre-TRIA policies suggests that 
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B. CYBERTERRORISM
Cyberterrorism raises a separate, vital category of insurance.  
“Unsettling signs of al Qaeda’s aims and skills in cyberspace have led some 
government experts to conclude that terrorists are at the threshold of using 
the Internet as a direct instrument of bloodshed.”57  Two methods of attack 
are anticipated.  First, terrorist can target the Internet itself, thereby 
disrupting or destroying the free flow of data, leading to potentially large 
economic loss.  Insurers could conceivably seek coverage under their 
“business interruption insurance,” but only if the cause of the interruption is 
itself covered, which is to say only if the policyholder’s Internet disruption 
is the result of physical harm to their particular connection.  As a result, the 
majority of policyholders will not be covered by a general attack on the 
Internet. 
Second, a terrorist can use the medium of cyberspace (although not 
necessarily the Internet) to reach physical targets.  Major public systems are 
controlled by a centralized computer network.  So-called SCADA systems 
(Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems) are commonplace for 
large utilities and factories.  Even the “simplest” systems can “throw railway 
switches, close circuit-breakers or adjust valves in the pipes that carry water, 
oil and gas.”58 An outside force could seize control through invasive 
computer access.  Coverage for this type of assault may be available under 
terrorism insurance with these exclusions “does not differ materially.”  On the other 
hand, if the bulk of future terrorist attacks come in these forms, and are thus 
excluded, terrorism coverage could be deemed illusory or contrary to reasonable 
policyholder expectations, voiding the exclusions.  If the Treasury or State 
Departments were to shift and take this approach, the current support for TRIA by 
insurers would evaporate.  See Daniel B. Rubcock, Moody’s Approach to Terrorism 
Insurance After the Federal Backstop, 500 PLI Real Estate 335, 340 (Jan.-Feb. 
2004) (That insurers can exclude such losses even under TRIA is “the position 
taken by the [National Association of Insurance Commissioners] in its . . .guidance 
bulletin to state regulators, and by the U.S. Treasury Department in its December 3, 
2002 Interim Guideline Bulletin.”).
57
 Barton Gellman, Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared, WASH. POST, June 27, 
2002, at A1, see also James A. Lewis, Assessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, 
Cyber War, and Other Cyber Threats, Center for Strategic & International Studies 
(Dec. 2002) available at <<http://www.csis.org/tech/0211_lewis.pdf>>.  The 
Department of Homeland Security has created the U.S. Computer Emergency 
Readiness Team, available at <<http://www.us-cert.gov/>>, which “is charged with 
protecting our nation’s Internet infrastructure by coordinating defense against and 
response to cyber attacks.”  
58
 Gellman, Cyber-Attacks, WASH. POST, at A1.
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existing policies, although some evidence suggests the amount of coverage 
is insufficient.
A third, less likely potential target is the destruction of 
electronically stored data, such as that held by the financial services 
industry.  Permanent destruction would require both destruction of the data 
as stored on a primary system on any given day, and the back-up storage 
systems for that data.59 Systems for which stored data are vital, such as 
systems containing banking data, are backed up continuously, not daily.  
Both because permanent damage is unlikely, and because even the great loss 
of funds to one corporation does not have widespread public impact, this 
approach should be a less attractive target.  However, if losses do occur 
from this type of attack, coverage will be spotty at best.  Perhaps half of
policyholders may be able to successfully argue that they are covered under 
the definition of “property damage” in the standard commercial policy.60
Half will not.61
The difficulty attaining coverage for cyberlosses stems not from 
exclusions to coverage, as with biological or nuclear attacks, but from the 
absence of initial coverage in the basic agreement.62 More specific coverage 
is available in the form of computer crime policies, “inland marine” 
computer policies, and fidelity policies, which protect against internal 
sabotage.63 However, both the industry and policyholders have been 
59 See e.g., Qualstar White Paper, Are You Prepared for Data Terrorism, available 
at << http://www.qualstar.com/dtwp.pdf>>.
60
 “The few cases reported addressing the issue of whether data or media constitute 
‘tangible property’ are divided with little meaningful analysis offered by the courts 
in those decisions.”  Joshua Gold, Insurance Coverage for Internet and Computer 
Related Crimes, 19:4 Computer & Internet Law 8, 9 (2002).
61 See Lucker Manuf. v. The Home Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 808, 819 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(finding that electronic data damage because it is not the “tangible property” 
covered under the policy), but cf. American Guarantee & Liab. Co. v. Ingram 
Micro, Inc., 2000 WL 726789 (D. Ariz., Apr. 18, 2000) (finding that data loss due 
to a power outage was “physical loss or damage” covered under the policy).
62
 For a contrasting view, see David R. Cohen & Roberta D. Anderson, Insurance 
Coverage for “Cyber-Losses”, 35 Tort & Ins. L.J. 891 (2000).
63
 Some of this coverage is Internet specific, but irrelevant to terrorist activity.  For 
example, coverage is available for liability stemming from the policyholder’s 
activities on the Internet that lead to charges of libel, slander, or copyright 
infringement, among others.  See Kay Millonzi & William G. Passannante, Beware 
of the Pirates: How to Protect Intellectual Property, Risk Mgmt. at 39, 42 (Aug. 
1996).  
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perplexingly slow in their uptake of appropriate coverage.  The cyber risk, 
like the larger terrorism risk, is seriously underinsured.64
II.  INTERPRETING THE INSURANCE MARKET THAT EXISTED AFTER 
SEPTEMBER 11TH
While the extent of underinsurance for terrorism losses is not yet 
realized by many, no one denies that insurers attempted to pull-out of the 
terrorism market.  After a large hit to their reserves, insurers often prefer to 
decrease coverage, allowing a slow increase in capital to accumulate.  The 
alternative of raising external capital in the aftershock is more costly.65
History reveals that insurers use a combination of “rationing”:  reducing 
capacity  both the number of policies and the amount the policies cover 
 and upping premiums.  Of course, the increase in premiums is a natural 
reaction given the sudden decline in supply, and often, a corresponding 
increase in demand triggered by the original catastrophe.66
Pulling Out
To no one’s surprise, then, terrorism insurance was scarce after 
September 11.  It could be found in the market, from a few vendors, on a 
limited basis, for lower risk commercial properties only.  It was “effectively 
64
 “[O]nly an estimated 7% of companies carry cyber insurance today, according to 
a recent Ernst & Young survey.”  Andrew Marks, Internet coverage a road less 
taken; Protecting computer systems a big concern, but few buy policies; high cost a 
factor, 20:7 CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. 35, Feb. 16, 2004.
65 See Doherty, Insuring September 11th, 26:2/3 J. Risk & Uncertainty, at 186.  
However, in the period after 9/11, insurers were able to raise billions in new capital.  
See Robert P. Hartwig, Insurance Information Institute, One Hundred Minutes of 
Terror that Changed the Global Insurance Industry Forever, at 23, available at <<
http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/sept11/sept11paper/ >>.  This capital 
remains insufficient to carry any but the most limited terrorism risk. Id. at 23-24.
66 This behavior may suggest a cautionary tale: If insurers cannot count on the 
ability to ration post-catastrophe, they should be less willing to offer catastrophe 
coverage in the first place.  The current TRIA structure, which requires insurers to 
provide coverage to all policyholders, does not allow rationing by number of 
policyholders.  State regulation of terrorism premium increases, which likely keeps 
rates below market price, precludes rationing by price.  As long as insurers continue 
to be required to provide coverage, the lack of a rationing option may cause 
increased reluctance to provide coverage, but it will not matter.  If insurers are freed 
from the obligation to provide terrorism coverage, but fear that rationing will be 
severely regulated after a catastrophe, as it has been after several natural disasters, 
insurers may react by limiting their exposure up front. 
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unavailable or unaffordable for others, mostly large or prominent assets.”67
Obtaining coverage in New York City or Washington, D.C., was termed 
“difficult,” “very expensive,” or “impossible.”68  Of course, these patches of 
“difficulty” are not random, but reflect that New York and D.C. carry the 
greatest perceived risk of future attacks.69
Those few companies that were selling terrorism insurance limited 
coverage to $75 - $100 million.70  A more than sufficient amount for many 
properties, but not for those with the highest perceived risk of future attack.  
The best option for commercial entities at real risk, if they were able to find 
someone willing to sell, was to purchase multiple policies from multiple 
insurers, stacking the policies on top of one another.  This practice is 
common for large risks, but proved extremely difficult and expensive when 
few insurers were interested in providing coverage at all.
Moreover, the policies that could be purchased contained serious 
exclusions, carving out damage from bioterrorism, electrical terrorism, or 
nuclear terrorism.71  Disruption or destruction from many types of terrorist 
attacks would not be covered.  And the vast majority of reinsurers 
announced an unwillingness to support the terrorism risk at all.  For 70 
percent of reinsurers this unwillingness was realized on January 1, 2002, the 
day their reinsurance treaties expired.  The pullout of reinsurers and insurers 
is consistent with several different accounts of the market, but the details 
support one view of the others.
The “implicit insurance” model supports the view that intentional 
rationing of insurance after a catastrophic event, for similar future events, is 
the better interpretation of the post-9/11 picture than market failure.72
Ordinarily, the model predicts that the initial rationing will be temporary, 
even if insurance availability never returns to pre-event levels.  The 
67
 Daniel B. Rubock & Tad Phillip, CMBS: Moody’s Approach to Terrorism 
Insurance for U.S. Commercial Real Estate, 489 PLI Real Estate 365, 367 (Feb. 
2003).
68 See, e.g., id. at 368, 370 & n.5. 
69
 Premiums for property insurance on so-called “trophy” properties increased 
between 50 to 100 percent, until coverage for many such properties became 
unavailable altogether.  See, e.g., Spencer S. Hsu, Insurance Rates Rise in D.C., 
Soar Downtown, WASH. POST, June 13, 2002, at A1.  
70
 Rubock & Phillip, CMBS: Moody’s Approach to Terrorism Insurance, at 371.
71 See discussion infra at __.
72 See Neil Doherty & Lisa Lipowsky Posey, Availability Crises in Insurance 
Markets:  Optimal Contracts with Asymmetric Information and Capacity 
Constraints, 15 J. of Risk & Uncertainty 55 (1997) (presenting the implicit 
insurance model).
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magnitude of the 9/11 loss, its hit across different lines of insurance,73 and 
the remaining actuarial uncertainty, however, counsel against assuming that 
the model will accurately predict the availability of terrorism insurance if 
the federal government exits the market.74
Indeed, the reinsurers’ explanation for leaving the market 
complicates the usual “reserve shock” story.  Reinsurers concluded that the 
“actuarially intractable risk of terrorist attacks . . . could not be reliably 
calculated.”75  The nature of the risk itself, even had it been realized without 
a disaster like 9/11, caused independent concern.  David Lewis, an industry
reinsurance researcher, concluded that “[t]he size of potential terrorism 
losses is now so large that terrorism is . . . on the uninsurable side of the 
divide.”76  Others in the industry cited additional issues: “While new 
security measures and the war against terrorism will hopefully diminish the 
risk, it is nearly impossible to quantify the probabilities of what might 
happen over the next few years or months.”77  The general consensus was 
that “review of the fundamental principles of insurability reveal[] that 
terrorism is a distinct, uninsurable peril.”78
These claims may be overblown.  After all, initial panic led to 
irrationally heightened fears of widespread insolvency from 9/11 alone, and 
73
 The primary “lines” involved were commercial property, personal property, life, 
business interruption, event interruption, workers compensation, and liability 
insurance.  
74 See Neil A. Doherty et al., Insuring September 11th:  Market Recovery and 
Transparency, 26:2/3 J. of Risk & Uncertainty, 179, 182 (2003).
75
 Rubock, CMBS: Moody’s Approach at 369.
76
 American Association of Insurance Services, What Makes Terrorism Different?, 
26:3 Viewpoint (Winter 2002), available at 
<<http://www.aais.org/communications/viewpoint/02win1.htm>> (viewed Sept. 15, 
2003).
77 Stephen Lowe, managing principal in the Hartford, Conn. Office of Tillinghast-
Towers Perrin, quoted in American Association of Insurance Services, What Makes 
Terrorism Different?, 26:3 Viewpoint (Winter 2002), available at 
<<http://www.aais.org/communications/viewpoint/02win1.htm>> (viewed Sept. 15, 
2003).
78 Robert Faber, SCOR Reinsurance’s senior vice president and underwriting officer 
for North America, quoted in American Association of Insurance Services, What 
Makes Terrorism Different?, 26:3 Viewpoint (Winter 2002), available at 
<<http://www.aais.org/communications/viewpoint/02win1.htm>> (viewed Sept. 15, 
2003).
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that panic has subsided.79  Insurers exhibited some saliency bias in 
presuming that future attacks would mimic the first attacks, and redlined 
buildings over a certain height.80  This bias was also subsiding, in part due to 
increased airline security, by the time TRIA was passed.
Still, a thriving reinsurance terrorism market may be decades away.  
“Reinsurers could not put their actuarial finger on the ‘loss 
magnitude’ or even the ‘uncertainty of the loss magnitude’ 
for terrorist events.  That is, unlike natural events such as 
floods, hurricanes and earthquakes, because there were so 
few data points for catastrophic terrorist events, insurance 
underwriters could not figure out how big the next loss may 
be, how likely it was to occur, or even how shaky their 
calculations were of how likely or how big the next event 
may be.  Terrorist events are not random events:  the 
perpetrators try to avoid repeating themselves in patterns so 
as to minimize the chance of capture and maximize 
shock.”81
Terrorism differs from other intentional criminal acts, first in that there is a 
history of ordinary crimes that can be mined for emergent patterns, and 
second, in that terrorism on American soil is currently driven by one or a 
few organizational entities.  Predicting the actions of a single group of 
people becomes especially dicey with a group whose aim is to be 
unpredictable.  Of course, it is plausible that eventually the United States 
will have three or four separate international groups intent upon attacking 
the American public.  The picture is unlikely to become so crowded, 
however, that the intentional behavior of many actors emerges as a more 
random, and therefore more predictable, pattern.
However, there are market players who are known for taking on 
unusual or high risks, players who create their niche by servicing risks that 
others are unable or unwilling to touch.  Lloyd’s of London, for example, 
has the sheer reserves to take on extremely large catastrophic risk or “cat 
risk.”  The largest international reinsurers, such as Munich Re, Swiss Re, 
and Berkshire Hathaway, are often in a similar position.  While these groups 
79
 For a description of the initial panic, see Jackie Spinner, Terror-Insurance Market 
in Limbo; Inaction in Congress Leaves Firms Unable to Find or Renew Policies, 
WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2001, E01.
80
 Rubock, CMBS: Moody’s Approach at 370.
81
 Daniel B. Rubock & Tad Phillip, CMBS: Moody’s Approach to Terrorism 
Insurance for U.S. Commercial Real Estate, 489 PLI Real Estate 365, 369 (Feb. 
2003).
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are not yet fully involved, as might have been expected, some attempts to 
organize terrorism coverage for large clients were underway even before 
TRIA was passed.  These attempts give insight into what can be expected if 
the market is left unfettered after TRIA sunsets.
Proponents of the possibility of terrorism insurance point to a few 
examples.  Even those in the United States whose entire business is 
consulting on cat risk management acknowledge that “[w]ith no ‘event 
proven’ tools available to assess the risk, and a belief among some that 
terrorism risk is ‘unquantifiable’, market participants are showing a wide 
range of responses to the opportunity, and their obligations.” 82  Closer 
inspection, however, leads to disappointment.
Hiscox, an arm of Lloyd’s, created a “broker extranet system,” the 
Hiscox Terrorism Insurance Extranet, aimed at providing terrorism coverage 
of up to $25 million per building.83  Some touted this as proof that terrorism 
insurance for large risks was unproblematic.84  After all, as a spokesperson 
for the International Risk Management Institute, Inc., reported, using the 
extranet system, “[it] took . . . only about 10 minutes to underwrite and 
reserve coverage capacity for a hypothetical $10 million building in 
Dallas.”85  Dallas was not chosen by happenstance, it turns out; the fine print 
to the Hiscox system is that the downtown and city centers of Chicago, 
Houston, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, and 
Washington, D.C. are excluded!86  Given that many businesses outside of 
these cities are not interested in terrorism coverage, Hiscox is not a good 
demonstration of an insurer taking on serious, widespread terrorism risk.
In another group, six of the world’s largest insurers and reinsurers 
created the “Special Risk Insurance and Reinsurance Luxembourg SA” to 
82
 Matthew Grant, First Generation Terror Catastrophe Models Better Than Plain 
Ignorance, Insurance Day (Jan. 9, 2003), available at 
<<http://www.rms.commerce/NewsPress/NEWS_MG_ID_010903.asp>> (last 
visited 8/7/2003).
83 See Insurance Journal, Hiscox Launches New System for U.S. Terrorism 
Insurance, Oct. 14, 2002, available at
<<www.insurancejournal.com/news/newswire/international/2002/10/14/23694.htm
>>.
84 See Jack P. Gibson, Terrorism Insurance Update 2003, IRMI Insights (June 
2003), available at <<hhtp://www.irmi.com/insights/articles/gibson015.asp>>.
85 Id.
86 See Insurance Journal, Hiscox Launches New System for U.S. Terrorism 
Insurance, Oct. 14, 2002, available at
<<www.insurancejournal.com/news/newswire/international/2002/10/14/23694.htm
>>.
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provide coverage for limited forms of property damage and business 
interruption expenses.87  Given the vast capital resources of the 
collaboration, and the shared risk, the group’s offering is disappointing:  
“Policies offered will only cover damage to property resulting directly from 
an act of terrorism and will be focused in Europe.”88
These underwhelming first steps aside, attempts are being made to 
model terrorism risk.  As one risk manager put it, “first generation terrorism 
catastrophe models can provide a pragmatic alternative to bewildered 
ignorance.”89  Three American companies are taking the lead in the task, but 
none thus far has completed a model upon which an actuarially sound 
premium could be based.90  The models are limited, among other reasons, 
because much of the “data” used is relative.  For example, one firm 
concludes that New York and Washington, D.C. are the cities at highest 
risk, while another adds San Francisco to the list.91  Neither, however, can 
give the probability that any of these cities will be hit, only that each is more 
susceptible than other American cities.  This type of prediction does not rise 
to ordinary standards of “modeling”.
The Terrorism Exclusion
In the absence of cat risk specialists rushing to provide coverage, the 
most pronounced market response before the passage of TRIA was the 
attempt to exclude terrorism as a risk.  Insurers and national insurance 
organizations collaborated with the states on the creation of a terrorism 
exclusion.92  Following a common procedure for the design of new policy 
language, the Insurance Services Office (ISO) drafted a terrorism exclusion 
to be used in commercial property and liability policies.93  In an uncommon 
87
 Allianz AG, Bermuda’s XL Capital, and several other European partners formed 
the partnership.  See Insurance Journal, Six Leading Insurers To Set Up Joint 
European Venture to Cover Terrorist Risks, Apr. 5, 2002, available at
<<www.insurancejournal.com/news/newswire/international/2002/04/05/16146.htm
>>.
88 Id.
89
 Matthew Grant, First Generation Terror Catastrophe Models at 4.
90
 The companies are Risk Management Solutions, Inc., EQECAT, and Applied 
Insurance Research.  See David Brown, Predictions Aside, No One is Sure Where 
Terrorists Will Strike, Mar. 16, 2003, WASH. POST at A25.  
91 Id.
92 See Allyn & Mcneff, The Fall and Rise of Terrorism Insurance Coverage, 29 
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. at 829-31.
93
 For the property and casualty insurance market, the Insurance Services Office is a 
chief provider of underwriting information and drafter of policy language.  See
<<www.iso.com>> (defining itself as “an information company that serves the 
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move, ISO announced that any insurer, not just those with ISO licenses, 
could use the exclusion language.  After discussion and redrafting, the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners approved the exclusion.94
The ISO submitted the final exclusion to each state for official approval, 
without which the clause cannot be used in the objecting state.  
One version of the ISO terrorism exclusion defines terrorism as 
activities against persons, organizations or property of any 
nature: (1) that involve the following or preparation for the 
following: use or threat of force or violence; or commission 
or threat of a dangerous act; or commission or threat of an 
act that interferes with or disrupts an electronic, 
communication, information or mechanical system; and (2) 
when one or both of the following applies: the effect is to 
intimidate or coerce a government or the civilian population 
or any segment thereof, or to disrupt any segment of the 
economy; or it appears that the intent is to intimidate or 
coerce a government, or to further political, ideological, 
religious, social or economic objectives or to express (or 
express opposition to) a philosophy or ideology.  
The exclusion is more complex than a simple exclusion of terrorism 
losses.  For one, it does not automatically apply to every act of terrorism; the 
attack must be substantial.  If aggregate terrorism losses from a single 
“incident”95 exceed $25 million, the exclusion kicks in for property and 
liability coverage.  If the threshold is not met, but more than fifty people die 
or are seriously injured, the exclusion kicks in for liability coverage only.  In 
property/casualty industry, produces standardized policy contract language  forms 
and endorsements used widely throughout the industry to underwrite many lines and 
classes of insurance.”).  ISO is the acknowledged standard-bearer of such services.
94 See Press Release, Insurance Services Office, ISO Gratified by Insurance 
Regulators’ Call for Approval of Terrorism Exclusions (Dec. 21, 2001) available at
<<http://www.iso.com/press_releases/2001/12_21_01.html>>.  The National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners works closely with both the insurance 
industry and, under TRIA, the federal government.  The Treasury Department, 
responsible for implementing TRIA, “is closely coordinating with [NAIC] in 
implementing definitional and other aspects of the Program.”  Department of the 
Treasury Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Final Rule, 31 C.F.R. Part 50, at 5-6 
(July 7, 2003).
95
 Related multiple attacks that occur within 72 hours of one another are a single 
“incident” to which the threshold triggers apply.  See Hillman, Terrorism Insurance, 
U.S. GAO at 19, Appendix I.
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calculating the $25 million threshold, losses from the interruption of 
ordinary business are included, in addition to direct property loss.96
Second, the exclusion is unusually binary: if no threshold is met, the 
exclusion does not apply, but if a threshold is met, no losses from terrorism 
are covered, including those falling below the threshold.  In other words, the 
$25 million threshold doesn’t act as a cap, it acts as a toggle switch; if 
damage exceeds $25 million, all terrorism losses are excluded.  Therefore, at 
$24.9 million, there is coverage up to that amount, but at $25.1 million, 
there is no coverage at all.97  Another oddity of the trigger point is that it 
does not turn on whether the insurer at hand owes over or under $25 million, 
nor on whether its particular insured suffered over $25 million as a group; it 
turns on the losses to the nation as a whole. 98
The ISO version of the terrorism exclusion does not address nuclear, 
chemical, or biological attacks, which are already excluded under other 
96
 Business interruption coverage comes in various forms, but this exclusion limits 
business interruption losses to those businesses directly physically affected.
97
 Imagine the public uproar if health insurance plans adopted a similar exclusions 
structure.  Caps on coverage are expected, such that reimbursement for only the first 
$10,000 of a hospital stay might aggravate but not surprise.  Under a binary 
exclusion, however, a patient would have costs covered up to $10,000, but receive 
nothing if costs exceeded $10,000.
98
 Not every proposed terrorism exclusion has a similar threshold.  Here are two 
examples of non-ISO terrorism exclusions: 
“This policy does not insure against any loss, damage, cost, or expense caused by or 
resulting from any of the following, regardless of any cause or event contributing 
concurrently or in any other sequence thereto . . .any act or threatened act, by any 
person or persons, arising from or related to any attempt to overthrow, coerce, 
intimidate or establish any government or sovereign power (de jure or de facto) or 
to intimidate or coerce a civilian population or any segment thereof, or to inflict 
economic loss, property damage or personal injury, in furtherance of any political, 
religious, financial or ideological objectives.”  Jack P. Gibson, Terrorism Insurance 
Coverage for Commercial Property – A Status Report, IRMI Insights (June 2002), 
available at <<hhtp://www.irmi.com/insights/articles/gibson013.asp>> (as of Nov. 
18, 2003).  Note that this exclusion is not limited to international terrorism, and 
might include political domestic attacks, for example, on abortion clinics.  
“This insurance does not cover any loss or damage occasioned by or through or in 
consequence, directly or indirectly, of any of the following occurrences, namely . . . 
Act of terrorism committed by a person or persons acting on behalf of or in 
connection with any organization . . .For the purpose of this condition, ‘terrorism’ 
means the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of violence for the 
purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.”  Id.
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exclusions.99  For those terrorism exclusions that do reiterate that nuclear, 
biological, and chemical (“NBC”) attacks are excluded, the exclusion is 
absolute, and requires no threshold trigger.  However, if a non-terrorist party 
accidentally releases biological or chemical agents as a result of a terrorist 
attack, coverage is not excluded unless a threshold is reached.  It is 
important to note that this allowance of coverage for an accidental, non-
terrorist release does not create coverage if it does not already exist; it 
simply fails to remove coverage.  Therefore, if a separate exclusion for 
chemical release or pollution is in place, as it commonly will be, there is no 
coverage regardless of whether a threshold allows the terrorism exclusion to 
“double exclude” the losses.
Forty five states, and the District of Columbia, approved the basic 
form of the terrorism exclusion, but with some reservations and required 
changes.100  Those states that rejected or did not approve the exclusion are 
not marginal states in the insurance world  New York, California, Florida, 
Georgia, and Texas  and make up more than 35 percent of the commercial 
U.S. market.101  From a terrorist risk perspective, New York and California 
are, of course, particularly key.  
The proliferation of terrorism exclusions pre-TRIA suggests that 
they would return in force if permitted.  None of the market’s responses to 
September 11 have been great successes.  The voluntary, non-TRIA market 
remains weak, especially for those in the riskiest positions.  The modeling of 
the terrorism risk in the hopes of calculating premiums, limits, and 
necessary reserves has yet to reach a usable calculation.  If TRIA sunsets 
without a similar replacement, the terrorism insurance marketplace seems 
likely to resemble the premium-TRIA one, at least for a time.
Why Insurers Sought to Bind Themselves
Given the argument to date, one should wonder why the insurance 
industry fell in line behind TRIA.  Put roughly, after losing the battle for 
industry-preferred programs, both insurers and reinsurers concluded that 
TRIA was better than several dangerous alternatives.  Hardly a trivial 
inducement was the huge pledge of financial aid in the form of federal 
government as highly subsidized reinsurer.
99 See Press Release, Insurance Services Office, ISO Gratified by Insurance 
Regulators’ Call for Approval of Terrorism Exclusions (Dec. 21, 2001) available at
<<http://www.iso.com/press_releases/2001/12_21_01.html>>. 
100 See Richard J. Hillman, Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to 
Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE at 5 (2002).
101 Id. at 5.
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Reinsurers 
Before the passage of TRIA, the Reinsurance Association of 
America (RAA), representing the views of many reinsurers, weighed in on 
the side of government involvement in the reinsurance market.  The RAA 
urged “the US Congress to create a terrorism insurance safety net to provide 
necessary coverage and assure financial support for those insurers 
continuing to risk their capital in insuring this risk.” 102  Industries do not 
ordinarily lobby the government to take over the industry’s function, but the 
incentives in this instance were strong.
First, unlike the heavily state-regulated primary insurance market, 
reinsurers were and are unregulated.103  Reinsurers live with the constant 
fear that they too will become a regulated industry, required to hold set 
levels of reserve, seek approval for policy language, or, less likely, observe 
rate limits.  This fear has been heightened in recent years by a growing 
movement to federalize, and therefore revolutionize, insurance regulation.104
The creation of a new federal regulation structure could prompt a 
reexamination of the relative autonomy enjoyed by reinsurers.  Moreover, 
many reinsurers are international corporations whose American activity 
could more plausibly be regulated at the federal level.105
102
 Reinsurance Assoc. of America, The Reinsurance Market: The Impact of the 
September 11th Terrorism Catastrophe, <<www.reinsurance.org>> 
(S:\SHARED\STATELAW\Terrorism_Generic\q&a terrorism and re blk final dec 
12 01.doc) at 1 (April 24, 2002).
103
 [B]ecause reinsurance markets are global in scope and because reinsurance 
transactions are considered to be contracts between sophisticated parties, neither the 
prices nor the conditions of such coverage are subject to direct regulation.”  
Hillman, Terrorism Insurance, U.S. GAO at 3-4.  See also, Kimball & Pfennigstorf, 
Legislative and Judicial Control of the Terms of Insurance Contracts, 39 Ind. L.J. 
675 (1964); and Kimball & Pfennigstorf, Administrative Control of the Terms of 
Insurance Contracts, 40 Ind. L.J. 143 (1965).
104
 At a recent meeting of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 
“Rep. Mike Oxley, R-Ohio, chairman of the House Financial Services Committee, 
gave state insurance regulators the outlines of likely legislation to increase the 
federal role in overseeing the industry.  The last time NAIC was being threatened by 
federal regulation was when Rep. John Dingell, a Democrat, led the fight . . .during 
the 1980s and 1990s.”  Marie Suszynski, Company Representative Has Seen NAIC 
Gain Importance Over 32 Years, BEST’S INS. NEWS, March 22, 2004; See also
Regulation – U.S. Insurance Industry Facing Regulation, REINSURANCE, Apr. 1, 
2004, available at 2004 WL 67499735.
105
 The RAA estimates that non-U.S. reinsurers have 46 percent of the U.S. 
reinsurance market, and that this percentage is growing.  Reinsurance Assoc. of 
America, Alien Reinsurance in the U.S. Market 2000 Data (December 2001).  Many 
American-based reinsurers also have international clients.  
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Against this backdrop came September 11th, and the largest 
reinsurer losses to date.  Before 9/11, reinsurers did not consider themselves 
to be insuring large-scale American terrorism losses, in part because their 
clients, primary insurers, did not consider themselves to be insuring these
losses.  After 9/11, reinsurers did not want to insure American terrorism 
losses; in addition to the large hit reinsurers reserves had taken, reinsurers 
faced the now familiar difficulty in risk calculation.
At this moment, some may conclude that reinsurers overacted to the 
events of 9/11.  After all, there have been no terrorist attacks on American 
soil since, and precautions against future attacks are now in place.  But just 
as 2001 was an atypical year, costing reinsurers 60 to 80 percent of the total 
insured losses from September 11th,106 the calm of 2002 may prove to be 
atypical for the coming decade.  No one, including reinsurers, can forecast a 
“typical” year in the United States for terrorism losses.  Even if it could be 
guaranteed that a disaster the size of 9/11 would only occur once more in the 
next decade, the industry claims it cannot take the hit.  
Such a risk limit cannot be guaranteed, of course.  The reinsurers 
take the public position that “[i]nfinite risk simply cannot be written on a 
finite capital base.”107  True, if a bit melodramatic. No one expects the 
insurance industry to take on infinite risk.  Both high deductibles and early 
caps will allow an insurer, and its reinsurer, to avoid infinite risk.  
Reinsurers, in turn, will have to limit the amount of risk that is ceded to 
them in the reinsurance “treaty.”108  Reinsurers may then have to retrocede 
more risk than is common to retrocessionaires, a reinsurers’ reinsurer.  In 
short, the potentially cataclysmic nature of terrorism requires that no one 
entity be left holding too much of the bag.
However, reinsurers had another reason for encouraging 
government “reinsurance” of terrorism risks: reinsurers cannot orchestrate 
their collective behavior.  The standard insurance industry, while regulated, 
is exempt from antitrust laws in the United States.109  Reinsurers are not.  
Unlike insurers, reinsurers cannot jointly discuss and create terrorism 
exclusions, for example.  In a market as competitive as the American 
insurance market, therefore, reinsurers faced a great uncertainty about what 
106
 Reinsurance Assoc. of America, The Reinsurance Market: The Impact of the 
September 11th Terrorism Catastrophe, supra note __, at 2-3.
107 Id. at 3.
108
 The contract between an insurer and its reinsurer is a “treaty” in which a certain 
amount of risk is said to be ceded to the reinsurer by the insurer. If the reinsurer 
then “retrocedes” to yet another insurer, this is called retrocession.
109
 The McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
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actions could be taken to protect remaining reserves without becoming 
uncompetitive.  On the one hand, continuing to provide reinsurance could 
ruin the company, if a second attack were large enough; the decision to 
continue insuring terrorism risks could amount to betting the company.  On 
the other hand, if some reinsurers provided terrorism coverage and others 
did not, competitive forces could drive those who did not from the market, 
amounting to a decision to run the company into the ground.  
Reinsurers wanted out of the terrorism risk market in the United 
States, but without either being regulated back into the market, or becoming 
uncompetitive at the hands of other reinsurers.  An industry-wide retreat, 
backed by government provided “reinsurance,” temporarily solved this 
collective action problem.  First, the government solution diminished any 
urge to instigate regulation of the reinsurance market.  Second, close to all 
reinsurers had already committed to some form of terrorism exclusion for 
the coming policy year of 2002.  The competitive danger came from the 
possibility that a few reinsurers, particularly those who did not bear much of 
the 9/11 hit, would find a way to re-enter the terrorism risk market, at least 
on a limited basis, after 2002.  The provision of mandatory federal 
“reinsurance” ensured that at most a limited market for such reinsurance 
would exist until the federal program ended.110
Reinsurers got what they wanted in TRIA.  The Act states that 
“[n]othing in this title shall be construed to alter, amend, or expand the 
terms of coverage under any reinsurance agreement . . . .  The terms and 
conditions of such an agreement shall be determined by the language of that 
agreement.”111  In the long run, reinsurers may conclude that federal 
intervention in the catastrophic insurance market is against their interests, 
but for now we cannot expect reinsurers to push for a fundamental change to 
the program.
Primary Insurers
While reinsurers pulled out of the terrorism market at the end of the 
2001 calendar year, ordinary insurers could not pull out as fast.  The vast 
majority of “reinsurance contract renewals tend to be concentrated at the 
beginning of January and July, [but] primary insurance contracts tend to 
renew at a relatively even rate over the year.”112  Ordinary insurers were 
110
 Some businesses seeking to transfer their specialty risks, or particularly large 
risks, would still have a demand for reinsurance of terrorism risks on top of TRIA.  
For most lines of commercial property insurance, however, the reinsurance market 
is dominated by the federal intervention.
111
 TRIA § 6(b).
112
 Hillman, Terrorism Insurance, U.S. GAO at 4.
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therefore left with outstanding contractual obligations to their policyholders, 
including terrorism coverage, that could no longer be shifted to reinsurers.  
Moreover, because insurers are state regulated, they could not pull out of the 
terrorism market even as contracts came up for renewal until terrorism 
exclusions were approved, if ever.113
Once approved, insurers would commonly have to give one to three 
months notice to their policyholders before including a change like the 
terrorism exclusion in a renewed policy, so that the policyholder has an 
adequate chance to consider another insurer.  Therefore, any policies that 
came up for renewal one to three months after an exclusion was approved 
could not contain the exclusion for another full policy year.114  In short, 
primary insurers were facing a long period of exposed risk without the aid of 
reinsurance.  Recall that reinsurers bore approximately two-thirds of the loss 
burden from 9/11, so that the massive hit insurers had taken in 9/11 was 
modest compared to the hit they would take if another attack occurred 
without reinsurance.115
This unexpected exposure has been dubbed “risk overhang.”116 An 
insurer that thought it was on the risk for 30%, at the price charged and the 
reserves saved, finds itself on the risk for 100%, with no accompanying 
increase in reserve funds.  This explains the initial panic among primary 
insurers for the first year or so after reinsurers left the market.  
It is not the case, however, that insurers were willing to provide 
terrorism coverage once the risk overhang period passed.  For reasons that 
are more fully explored below, insurers cannot take on a potentially 
catastrophic risk in a market without reinsurer backup.117  Several aspects of 
terrorism conspire to interfere with necessary diversification of the risk and 
effective risk pooling.  Because losses are likely to be concentrated in time, 
113 See discussion of terrorism exclusions, supra, at __.
114 Insurance policies can be modified during the contract year by adding a rider or 
endorsement to the policy, but only if the parties mutually consent.  See 2 COUCH 
ON INS. § 25.22 (3d ed.2003); 43 AM. JUR. 2D INSURANCE § 362 (2003).  A 
policyholder may take the position that it will only allow a restriction of coverage if 
the premium is reduced, or an insurer may seek to drop the policyholder if consent 
is not granted.
115
 Hillman, Terrorism Insurance, U.S. GAO at 8.
116 See Anne Gron & Andrew Winton, Risk Overhang and Market Behavior, 74 J. 
Bus. 591, 606 (2001); Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance 
Markets: A Role for the Government as Insurer?, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 447, 454-55 
(2003) (identifying the post-9/11 primary insurer market as an example of risk 
overhang).
117 See discussion on risk distribution, infra at __ to __.
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among those limited policyholders who bought terrorism coverage, and 
affect more than one type of insurance simultaneously, insurers will have 
difficulty averaging the risk out.  
If the risk cannot be played off successfully against itself, it must be 
played against other risks –- a job usually assigned to reinsurers.  In 
addition, the sheer magnitude of the larger terrorist attacks would also place 
it in the category of risks normally ceded to a reinsurer.  It is therefore 
unsurprising that primary insurers sought the protection of some kind of 
“reinsurance,” especially as it came subsidized. 
III. IT MAY BE MONEY, BUT IT’S NOT INSURANCE 
If terrorists again attack seriously, TRIA will provide money to 
insurers, insurers will provide money to policyholders, but insurance will be 
in short supply.  Insurance is not the mere act of paying funds to reimburse a 
person or entity for losses.  Instead, it entails the transfer of risk from one 
party to another.  This entails the calculation of the risk  a determination 
of what to charge for taking the risk and a determination of how much must 
be kept in reserve to cover those risks realized per time period.  
Insurance pools risk with others similarly situated, and balances the
entire subset of risks with other independent risks, a form of hedging your 
bets.  Moreover, insurance is not just the act of transferring risk from one 
party to another; it is the act of diminishing or eliminating the element of
risk altogether.  Consider, for example, 100,000 similarly situated 
businesses, each with a 10% chance of a particular loss in any given year.  
The risk to an individual business can be substantial in part because the 
variation from year to year creates uncertainty.  For an insurer, however, the 
variation, and hence the uncertainty, is much lower; each year 
approximately 10,000 (10% of 100,000) of the businesses will experience 
the loss.  By distributing individual risks across a large pool, therefore, the 
risk the insurer takes on is much less than the risk transferred by the 
policyholders.
In order to transfer risk in this way, the risk must fall in the 
“insurable middle” between the realms of complete ignorance and absolute 
knowledge, or certainty.  On one end of the spectrum, there is no gain in 
paying another to bear the cost of a fully known event.  A homeowner who 
knows his house will be consumed by fire tomorrow, and knows the full 
extent of the damage, could reveal these facts to his insurer (it would be 
fraud to not do so), but the price of the resulting coverage would be the 
amount of his loss (minus a deductible) plus administrative costs and profit.  
The homeowner gains nothing.  In fact, he is worse off for purchasing 
insurance, having paid the insurer more than he gets in return.
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On the other end of the spectrum is ignorance., sometimes defined 
as the subjective assignment of equal probabilities to all states of nature.118
George Schackle thought complete ignorance should “be interpreted as 
meaning that all states of nature have zero potential surprise.”119 Depending 
on one’s turn of mind, it could be interpreted as all states of nature being full
of surprise.  In either case, insurance flounders.  Assume the same
homeowner knows the value of his house, but little else.  He does not know 
that black mold exists, he does not know that it will grow inside his house 
for the next year, and he does not know the coming cost to his house or 
medical expenses.  
His insurer and he share this ignorance, although both are aware that 
there may be hidden risks.  Both know they don’t know, but they don’t 
know what they don’t know.  The homeowner could ask his insurer to cover 
him for all damage from all unknown risks.  On the one hand, how different 
can the future be from the past?  On the other hand, having seen the 
insurance insolvencies caused by asbestos, breast implants, and 
environmental pollution, the insurer should be skittish.120  Not only will the
insurer be ignorant of the risk of the unknown event, it will not know how 
much it could cost, or whom else to place in the risk pool.
Of course, most policyholders only seek insurance for those risks of 
which they are at least moderately aware.  This does not mean that 
policyholders won’t seek reimbursement for losses they did not anticipate, 
of course.  Businesses did not consider terrorism insurance before 
September 11, for instance, because it “was not even in the set of possible 
outcomes that people took into account when assessing the likely risks they 
faced.”121 This did not prevent businesses from expecting terrorism 
coverage from their insurers.
118 See Kenneth J. Arrow & Leonid Hurwicz, An Optimality Criterion for Decision-
making under Ignorance, in C.F. Carter & J.L. Ford, eds., UNCERTAINTY AND 
EXPECTATIONS IN ECONOMICS 2 (1972) (referring to the work of B. De Finetti, 
among others).
119 Id.  
120 See, e.g., Thelma Jarman-Felstiner, Mold is Gold: But, Will it be the Next 
Asbestos, 30 Pepp. L. Rev. 529 (2003), cf. Dominick J. Graziano & Martha M. 
Collins, Proliferating Mold Litigation: Why Mold is Not the Next “Asbestos” 77 
Fla. B.J. 72 (Apr. 2003).
121
 W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce 
Terrorism Risks.  The economic and risk literature has been exploring these facets 
of risk for decades.  See Howard Kunreuther et al., Ambiguity and Under-Writer 
Decision Processes, 26 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 337 (1995); Colin F. Camerer & 
Howard Kunreuther, Experimental Markets for Insurance, 2 J. Risk & Uncertainty 
265-300 (1989).  The two “Journals of Risk” – The Journal of Risk and Uncertainty
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Now that we know the risk is real, we have emerged from 
ignorance.  Post-ignorance, however, there remains a distinction between 
risk and uncertainty.122 A potential loss or danger is identified.  Not 
surprisingly, we cannot pin down the exact timing or magnitude of the loss, 
or perhaps on whom the loss will fall.  The question is, how vast is our 
uncertainty?  If we know the statistical likelihood, the risk is manageable.  
Moreover, across groups and time, our uncertainty may not seem like 
uncertainty at all — patterns may emerge, lending shape to the greater 
whole. 
For example, assume we have actuarial data on the number of 
accidental, insurable fires that will occur in homes across America over a 
period of 10 years.  Pockets of ignorance remain: will the damage caused by 
fires increase as general wealth increases, or will the damage decrease as 
flame retardant fabrics or home fire extinguishers proliferate?  One reason 
these questions cannot be answered precisely is that the answer depends on 
a future that remains volatile.  If Dupont invents a new fabric or the national 
funding for local fire departments is suddenly doubled by federal grants, the 
severity and cost of fires could change in a way not predicted by statistics 
drawn from the past. 
But the future is always in flux, always open to a sea change that 
could render actuarial data less accurate, less representative of the causative 
picture.  This fact has led some to reject as illusory the distinction between 
risk and uncertainty.  After all, in both cases we are making a prediction 
about the future based on the past.  In the case of uncertainty, however, we 
have much less information.  The fact that the information we do have under 
risk is imperfect does not mean that we should be indifferent between risk 
and uncertainty when placing a bet.  With uncertainty, we guess, but with 
risk, we can know how much to bet, when, and how often.
and The Journal of Risk and Insurance – provide both experimental and theoretical 
risk analysis.  There is a breed of less legally relevant journals, if you remove the 
“risk and” requirement, including The Journal of Risk Finance, The Journal of Risk 
Research, The Journal of Risk Decision and Policy, and the pure Journal of Risk.  
122
 The contrast between risk and uncertainty comes from Frank Knight’s original 
framework.  See Frank H. Knight, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921) 
(Houghton Mifflin).  The basic concept named “uncertainty” by Knight has changed 
titles, most commonly to “ambiguity.”  See Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent 
Developments in Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. Risk & 
Uncertainty 325, 326 (1992). The dichotomy can also be understood in terms of 
unambiguous probability (risk) versus ambiguous probability (uncertainty). See
Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. Econ. 643-669 
(1961).
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An insurer must first answer how much it should set aside in reserve 
to meet all expected losses, and so how much it should charge for a given 
risk.  Insurers use actuarial science to answer these questions.  Next, 
“[g]iven the importance to society and the general economy of having sound 
financial institutions able to meet all their obligations, how much capital 
should an insurance company have above and beyond its reserves to absorb 
losses that are larger than expected?”123 In other words, how much does the 
company need to have to remain solvent in the worst of times. Being able to 
calculate a risk and combine it with enough other similar risks to apply the 
law of large numbers allows insurers to answer this final question with an 
amount astoundingly smaller than it would need if it had to assume that all 
risks would come due at once.
In a circumstance of true uncertainty, as with American terrorism, 
these questions cannot be answered.  One reason the insurance industry 
pushed for some sort of federal intervention after 9/11 was their inability to 
answer this final question.  For the most part, an insurer must have access to 
its funds up front, but all insurers knew with any certainty was that the 
amount of funds needed would be vast.  Reinsurers were unwilling to make 
that guess or keep those funds at risk.  The federal government, on the other 
hand, can take the funds directly from the Treasure Department —which 
runs the TRIA program —without reserving the full necessary amount in 
advance.  Moreover, the federal government will not declare bankruptcy.  
It is an advantage, then, that the government can provide a source of 
relatively unlimited funds that obviates the need to answer the third 
question, but it does not answer the question.  Nor does it make it possible 
for insurers under the TRIA program to answer the premium and reserve
questions.  Premiums being charged now for terrorism insurance are more 
likely to reflect the limit put on the new premiums by state insurance 
commissioners than an educated judgment by the insurer as to the price of 
the risk.124  In short, TRIA mimics the structure of insurance, but it does not 
twist money into insurance.  The water is not yet wine.  
IV.  THE RISK IS INCALCULABLE AND UNINSURABLE
Both “insurers and reinsurers have determined that terrorism is not 
an insurable risk at this time.”125 We can judge the merits of this claim by 
123
 Michael E. Bean, PROBABILITY: THE SCIENCE OF UNCERTAINTY 8-9 (2001).
124 See discussion of state premium approval process, infra, at __.
125 See Richard J. Hillman, Terrorism Insurance: Rising Uninsured Exposure to 
Attacks Heightens Potential Economic Vulnerabilities, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE at 1 (2002) (statement on behalf of GAO, “based on discussions with a 
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establishing the nature of the terrorism risk. An insurable risk meets three 
conditions; a subsidized insurable risk need meet only two.126 The first two 
conditions are calculation and distribution.  First, innumerable calculations 
lie behind any insurance agreement, but four primary ones are central here.  
The insurer must be able to estimate (1) the chance an event will take place; 
(2) the amount of loss from the event; (3) the price, or a set of premiums for 
each category of policyholders; and (4) the amount the must be kept in 
reserve to pay for the loss when the event occurs.  This fourth calculation is 
not a simple next step from calculations one and two; it requires setting a 
balance with the rest of the insurer’s obligations.  In the case of a serious 
terrorist attack, this balance becomes hard to strike as multiple obligations 
become due at once.
This leads to the second insurability requirement: the insurer must 
be able to distribute the risk it has taken on so that risk pooling is possible 
and the law of large numbers works in the insurer’s favor.  
As the number of ventures in a group or “pool” is increased, 
there is a greater likelihood that the favorable and the 
harmful experiences will tend to be balanced – that is, 
grouping a large number of ventures in a pool increases the 
probability that the losses suffered by all the ventures will 
be spread over time.127
To see why this is so, consider an insurer that takes on a single large risk.  
The risk cannot be offset against other risks because the insurer has no 
others.  It cannot be risk pooled in a pool of one, which means that the 
unpredictable elements of timing and an large outlier loss cannot be made
more predictable by being offset against other risks.  We might think the 
insurer at least has one advantage over the policyholder retaining the risk in 
that the insurer can better afford to take the hit when the risk is realized.  But 
insurers are not money trees; their funds come from premium collection and 
investment.  Either the policyholder keeps the premium or the insurer takes 
it, but in this example the insurer only has an advantage if it has superior 
investment ability. 
This example is fanciful, but it reveals the added value of shifting a 
risk to an insurer.  The actual risk is diminished if a real world insurer takes 
it on because the insurer’s ability to offset the risk against others makes the 
variety of insurance industry participants, regulators, policyholders, and other 
affected parties.”).
126 See Paul K. Freeman & Howard Kunreuther, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK 
THROUGH INSURANCE (1997).
127
 Robert E. Keeton & Alan I. Widiss, INSURANCE LAW § 1.3 (1988 ed.).
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loss more predictable.  Before considering the terrorism risk itself, consider 
a second example of an insurer that unknowingly takes on 100,000 identical 
risks — implausibly identical in that all 100,000 will become due at the 
same time.  What is the advantage of being an insurance company in this 
instance?  None, again, in that the risks are simply piling up on top of each 
other, instead of balancing one another out.  
These first two conditions suffice to make a risk insurable; if all the 
relevant calculations can be made, and the risk can be pooled, the act of 
collecting money and paying out when the risk is realized is insurance, not 
plain recompense.  When insurers evaluate whether a risk is insurable, they 
add the third condition of profitability.  An insurer might be able to calculate 
the risk and premiums, but not be able to attract any buyers at the set
premiums.  “In other words, it may be impossible to specify a rate for which 
there is sufficient demand and incoming revenue to cover the development, 
marketing, and claims cost of the insurance and still yield a net positive 
profit.”128
While insurers might label such a risk “uninsurable,” it is more 
precise to recognize that the risk is insurable, but at a price the public does 
not wish to pay.  In short, there is no market for it.  If there is demand for 
the insurance, but not at a profitable price, government-subsidized premiums 
can make up the difference to meet the actuarially sound price of the risk.  
In these cases, the policyholders are genuinely insured; the risk is 
transferred on the basis of accurate premiums and appropriate reserves.
How does the American terrorism risk measure up on these three
fronts of calculation, distribution, and profit?  Another terrorist attack on the 
United States is not a risk at all, it is an uncertainty;129 this uncertainty 
interferes with all three.  For the first condition, the calculation of risk, 
“perhaps a better phrase is ‘ignorance,’ since many [potential] states of the 
world are not defined.”130  This ignorance is costly, perhaps too costly for 
the third condition of marketability.  In addition, the second condition of 
risk pooling cannot be met for larger terrorist attacks, the category of attacks 
addressed by TRIA.  An in-depth analysis will reveal the erosive effect of 
ignorance.
128 Kunreuther & Roth, PAYING THE PRICE, at 27.
129 See discussion supra at __.
130
 W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce 
Terrorism Risks, 26:2/3 J. Risk & Uncertainty 99, 105 (2003).  Viscusi & 
Zeckhauser argue that, “[g]iven this, attempts to estimate terrorism risks will fall 
prey to some of the more salient biases and anomalies that have been identified in 
the risk in uncertainty literature,” including “hindsight effects and the substantial 
premium paid for zero-risk outcomes.”  Id. 
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Calculating the Risk
Insurance risks are calculated using historical or scientific data.  
Scientific data is not a candidate with terrorism, but nor is history is a guide.  
The short, uneven history of terrorism within the United States offers too 
few, and too dissimilar, data points.  There had been terrorist attacks within 
the United States before 9/11, of course: the 1993 bombing of the World 
Trade Center, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, and the 1996 Olympic 
Park bombing in Atlanta.  Even if the last two are not separated from the 
internationally motivated attacks on the World Trade Center, the four 
existing data points do not paint a rich picture.  The occasionally bombings 
of American embassies overseas are even less relevant to an actuarial 
analysis.  
As a result, no actuarial tables exist, nor could meaningful ones be
created.  Indeed, the history before 9/11 led insurers to conclude the 
terrorism risk could be ignored.131  In 1997, the President’s Commission on 
Critical Infrastructure Protection interviewed insurance executives and 
reported that the “threat of terrorist attacks, excluding cyber attacks, on 
facilities in the U.S. [was] considered insignificant by insurance 
companies.”132 To follow the one new data point would be to conclude that 
every hundred years or so, an attack on the level of 9/11 can be expected.  
Neither the government nor insurers are willing to bank on this forecast.
Unfortunately, history does not even limit the set of possible 
outcomes.  The number of foreign terrorist attacks in the United States in 
2002 was zero.133  This, of course, is the absolute low end of the possible 
sets.  There is no absolute high end set, but it would be foolish to envision a 
terminal high end set that was not substantially worse than September 11th.  
The universe of sets in between these two points is unlimited.  
Moreover, the set will change over time, perhaps dramatically.  
Even if we could know the precise risk of each type of terrorist attack for 
tomorrow, knowing the risk a year or two from now requires incorporating 
the risk of large shifts in political power or the failure of American military 
and peacekeeping efforts abroad.  Dramatic upward shifts in the probability 
131
 Report to the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
Liability and Insurance: Infrastructure Assurance, 60 (1997), at
<<http://www.ciao.gov/resource/pccip/pccip_documents.htm>>.
132 Id. at 59.
133
 This statement assumes, as law enforcement currently believes, that the anthrax 
attacks were implemented by an American.  See Editorial, The Anthrax 
Investigation, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 2002, at A22.
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of a risk that stem from policyholder behavior can render a policy void.134
No parallel tool is available if the upward risk shift is caused by a l Qaeda or 
U.S. government policy.  
It is therefore the structure of the terrorism risk, not simply the high 
cost of 9/11, that makes the risk abnormally expensive to insure.  Two major 
sources of uncertainty will plague attempts to measure the risk of terrorism:  
parameter uncertainty and model uncertainty.  Parameter and model 
uncertainty are forms of “meta risk” — on top of the particular risk at hand 
is layered another risk, the additional risk that the measurement of the 
primary risk is wrong.  Both depend on the availability and accuracy of the 
data used to calculate the risk.  The correlation of the terrorism risk, 
discussed below, compounds this problem.135 With correlated losses, an 
insurer must retain a large amount of capital to back its promise to pay when 
so many, or so much, might be owed simultaneously.136
Parameter uncertainty, as the name implies, refers to the level of 
uncertainty in the choice of parameters or outer boundaries of the risk. 137 If 
the parameters are narrow, it is easier to gauge a likely outcome.  If the 
parameters are wide open, prediction becomes much more difficult.  For 
example, if an insurer is uncertain about the risk of loss, but knows it to be 
between two and three percent, prediction is feasible.  One option is to 
choose three percent and be ready to pay for losses at that rate.
But if the gap between options increases, the parameter uncertainty 
increases the amount of capital an insurer must have to carry a risk, often to 
134
 A traditional example is the car dealership that doubles its inventory, thereby 
doubling the risk to its property insurer.  See 2 COUCH ON INS. § 25:1 (3d ed. 2003).  
In the terrorism context, a policyholder could either increase how much was at stake 
under the policy, or increase the risk to the existing property or people by scaling 
back security measures in effect when the policy was signed.  Interestingly, because 
terrorist must make choices among the many available targets, simply failing to 
keep up with the security measures of one’s neighbors could lead to the same 
practical effect, although not the same insurance outcome.  Cf. Ian Ayres & Steven 
D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: 
An Empirical Analysis of Lojack, 113 Q. J. Econ. 43 (1998).
135
 See the discussion of correlated loss, infra at __.
136 This need will ordinarily up premium loading, again decreasing the demand for 
the coverage. Raising premium loadings limits the amount of risk insured, and
therefore lowers the demand for coverage; policyholders simply get less coverage 
for the money compared to the value of the risk.
137
 Frank Knight believed that “uncertainty” occurs when the distribution of possible 
outcomes is essentially unknown.  Exposure to uncertainty cannot be hedged or 
insured against. See Frank H. Knight, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT 19, & Ch. 
VII (1921).
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the point of capital that would be necessary if the highest estimate were 
correct.  For example, outside of the terrorism context, an insurer may think 
the probability of loss is either two percent or six percent, but consider each 
equally likely.  If the insurer were to split the difference, and collect 
premiums fitting a four percent probability of loss, the insurer will be 
underfunded if the accurate prediction is six percent.  Across a large number 
of policyholders, with a high loss, the underfunding would be severe.  
In the terrorism context, it is possible that the accurate prediction of 
a serious attack in a major city in the next ten years is high.  Can an insurer 
ignore this possibility because it is also possible that the accurate prediction 
is much lower?  Unless insurers have reason to think the likelihood of the 
first scenario is minute, insurers cannot responsibly offer terrorism coverage 
without reserving adequate capital for the serious attack.  If an insurer fails 
in this, and it has no or minimal reinsurance, it faces a depletion of its 
reserve for all its outstanding non-terrorism risks.  It also faces a non-
negligible risk of bankruptcy.  Therefore, a responsible insurer will calculate 
premiums and reserves based on the high boundary of possible predictions.
A second uncertainty, model uncertainty, comes from selecting the 
wrong model for the actuarial task.  Various risk management agencies have 
taken a stab at modeling terrorism insurance, but the necessary inputs are 
mostly missing.138  In the absence of scientific data, as for natural disasters, 
or historical data, as for most risks, building a model for the American 
terrorism risk is more akin to free verse poetry than mathematics.  
Unfortunately, the end to this uncertainty will come only when a history of 
both the model and the risk has been built, so the two can be compared.  As 
with most models, the test will be how closely the model aligns with reality.  
Before 9/11, property insurance modeling in the United States did 
not include terrorist attacks at all, a “model” that reflected reality for many 
years.  There is no question that any model created to assess terrorism risk 
today would be open to wide model uncertainty.  Indeed, the method used to 
calculate, say, the absolute highest terrorism risk a company could bear, 
might not rise to the level of “model” at all.139  Even those who attempt 
138 See discussion, infra, at __.
139
 Models do exist, but thus far the insurance industry has not jumped at the chance 
to apply them.  The most prominent is a “probabilistic terrorism insurance model” 
created by EQECAT, Inc., a firm that specializes in catastrophe modeling.  In a 
press release, the firm stated that “[t]errorism is a unique exposure and cannot be 
modeled using the same techniques currently used to model insurers’ earthquake 
and hurricane exposure.”  ABS Consulting, Press Release, EQECAT Releases 
Probabilistic Terrorism Insurance Model (September 12, 2002), available at 
<<http://www.eqecat.com/terrorism97.pdf>>.  Instead, the model “features a 
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modeling agree that “there is a lack of adequate historical data to support 
estimates of catastrophic losses, [and] the traditional methods for evaluating 
and estimating risk are not suitable to assess possible terrorism exposures, 
predict losses, [or] identify adequate rates and loss costs.”  
Finally, the evidence to date highlights the problems with risk 
calculation.  The subjective understanding of the terrorism risk, as opposed 
to the objective risk, has gone from a practical point of zero, to large but 
volatile and unknown.  “Much of the uncertainty created by the [9/11] event 
is the realization that the events set that we previously thought was possible 
was incomplete and that the future may contain many other severely adverse 
events that are currently unanticipated.”140  Any given individual’s attempt 
to assess the terrorism risk, even in one year increments, is “highly 
uncertain” and varies greatly with others’ assessments, according to a study 
by W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser.141
The industry’s initial reaction to 9/11 revealed, at a minimum, the 
saliency bias in action.142  On September 10, 2001, few expected or 
anticipated the use of hijacked planes as building bombs.  On September 12, 
and the days that followed, insurers had to wildly readjust their conception 
of the terrorist risk; in that re-conception, the form of attack taken on 9/11, 
vivid and salient in everyone’s mind, dominated industry reaction.143
Eventually, of course, this overreaction faded, and all began to take 
seriously the risk of smaller attacks, such as car bombs, and different 
attacks, such as dirty bombs and infrastructure disruption.  Because we do 
not know the actual probability of another 9/11-type attack, we do not know 
if insurers still overestimate that form of attack.
Viscusi & Zeckhauser’s experiment revealed additional cognitive 
biases that may still be operating in our risk calculations.144  Their subjects 
probabilistic set with over 10 million events and hundreds of thousands of high 
probability terrorism ‘target’ sites.”  Id. 
140
 W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties to Reduce 
Terrorism Risks, 26:2/3 J. Risk & Uncertainty 99, 100 (2003).
141 Id. at 111.
142
 Availability bias.  See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (Sept. 1974).
143
 Rubock & Phillip, CMBS: Moody’s Approach to Terrorism Insurance, 489 PLI 
Real Estate at 370.
144
 In addition to the embedding effect discussed here, Viscusi & Zeckhauser 
reported both hindsight bias and the “zero risk mentality.”  Participants revealed 
hindsight bias by failing to separate the actual risk of terrorist attacks before 
September 11, from their perceived risk.  The commonly perceived risk of such an 
attack was zero; the actual risk was higher, probably much higher.  Even assuming 
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suffered from the embedding effect; when asked to calculate the chance of 
terrorism in the airline context, and then the chance of terrorism in all 
contexts, subjects gave very similar answers.145  This is puzzling because the 
overall risk of terrorism has “embedded” in it the risk of terrorism in the 
airline context.  Therefore, the risk calculation for the overall risk should be 
substantially larger than the calculation for the airline context alone.  The 
answers participants provided would make sense only if people valued the 
non-airline risk as very small, which they do not.  
Ordinarily, the individual misperceptions of risks that come from 
common heuristics would not be of interest in a discussion of how the 
insurance industry makes risk calculations.  But without historical data, 
actuarial tables, or scientific predictions, the industry is left with the 
educated guesses of individual people, or, at a minimum, the aggregation of 
subjective data.146  “Terrorism risks, which are highly unpredictable and 
hardly subject to conventional statistical assessment, must be gauged as 
subjective probabilities, whether by experts or citizens.”147
The evidence to date suggests that insurers are either guessing what 
price to charge for terrorism coverage or strategically pricing to avoid it 
altogether.  According to one Midwestern broker, “There is great variance 
with no apparent logic. . . .  In some cases (for small and medium accounts), 
there is virtually no charge, and in others, over 100 percent [of the pre-
terrorism premium].  One insurer offered a local city coverage at about 105 
that steps taken since 9/11 have decreased the actual risk of a similar attack today, 
the risk today should be held to be higher than the perceived zero risk on September 
10, 2001.  Yet 40.4% of subjects held the current risk to be lower than they believed 
it to be before 9/11, while 17% held the current risk and past perceived risk to be 
equal.  Viscusi & Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties at 110-114.
     Subjects also showed a preference for reducing the terrorism risk to zero, even 
though you must “pay much more for reducing the risk to zero than is warranted by 
the extent of risk reduction.”  Id. at 115.  Viscusi and Zeckhauser note that this 
preference might not be irrational, in that the psychological benefit of removing a 
risk altogether may have great value.  On the other hand, some studies suggest that 
once a risk is very low, people tend to reduce the risk to zero in their own minds.  
145
 Viscusi & Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties at 113.
146
 “While [one popular] methodology” for trying to predict terrorism losses “is 
highly structured, in the end the outcome is still only opinion, though one that has 
been summarized statistically, rather than in terms of a majority vote.”  Howard 
Kunreuther et al., Assessing, Managing and Financing Extreme Events: Dealing 
with Terrorism, NBER Working Paper Series, available at
<<http://www.nber.org/papers/w10179>>
147
 Viscusi & Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties at 117.
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percent, and the county in which the city is located at 2 percent.”148  It might 
be objected that this example is surely an outlier; actuaries and insurance 
executives are highly trained specialist of risk calculation.  An outlier it may
be, but it is less obvious that the skill with which insurers usually calculate 
risk would lead to skillful risk calculation here, in the absence of 
manipulable data.
Here is a description of attempts to price terrorism coverage pre-
TRIA, when an insurer could still choose the quality and number of risks it 
took on:
For obvious reasons, the terrorism coverage underwriting 
process has not been very scientific.  Instead of using 
sophisticated models and actuarially developed rates, 
underwriters are relying on their experience and instincts to 
select the risks they feel are least likely to be hit.  The pay 
careful attention to aggregation of values, making certain 
that they do no insure multiple properties in close proximity 
so as to achieve a spread of risk.149
Selecting more moderate risks and best-guessing at the price is therefore one 
approach to setting premiums. 
If a property is considered too risky, and “a carrier does not want 
exposure, they [price] coverage at 100 percent of the property rate so that no 
clients elect the coverage.”150  In other words, where state commissioners 
have allowed it, some insurers have offered terrorism insurance as required 
by law, but for an additional premium that would double the current 
premium paid.  Businesses with smaller risks, wary of terrorism coverage in 
the first place, are unwilling to pay double.151  Businesses with substantial 
148
 Council of Insurance Agents & Brokers, “CIAB Shows Businesses Rejecting 
Terrorism Coverage,” IRMI Expert Commentary (March 2003) available at 
<<http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/CIAB004.asp>> (as of Nov. 18, 2003)
149
 Jack P. Gibson, Terrorism Insurance Coverage for Commercial Property – A 
Status Report, IRMI Insights (June 2002), available at
<<hhtp://www.irmi.com/insights/articles/gibson013.asp>> (as of Nov. 18, 2003).
150
 Council of Insurance Agents & Brokers, “CIAB Shows Businesses Rejecting 
Terrorism Coverage,” IRMI Expert Commentary (March 2003) available at 
<<http://www.irmi.com/expert/articles/CIAB004.asp>> (as of Nov. 18, 2003) 
(reviewing the general reluctance of insurers and policyholders to engage in 
terrorism coverage).
151
 “Small, relatively low-profile accounts seem to be able to find terrorism 
coverage at a reasonable cost, but many are opting not to buy it because they don’t 
think they are at risk.  On the other hand, some of the riskier operations, with real 
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risks should find it worth their while to switch insurers over doubled 
premiums, if another insurer will take them.  Insurers’ avoidance strategy 
may therefore be successful, where permitted.
A doubled premium will not always be the result of strategic pricing, 
however.  Some risks in Manhattan are being charged at 100 percent of the 
property premium, but by companies that are willing to charge 5 or 10 
percent in the outer boroughs of New York City.152  It could be that these 
insurers are trying to avoid Manhattan, or it may be that they perceive the 
risk there to be fairly priced.  Because insurers don’t have enough 
information to calculate the risk, this kind of relative difference based on 
location is one of the few aspects of terrorism coverage pricing that makes 
sense.
Distributing the Risk: Poor Risk Spreading
Four attributes of serious terrorist attacks interfere with risk 
spreading.  First, the terrorism risk is a correlated risk.  An independent or 
uncorrelated risk is not allied with the other risks with which it would be 
pooled by an insurer.  For instance, imagine a thousand storefronts, spread 
across five major cities, each with a similar chance of burglary.  With the 
exception of a riot, which is often excluded from coverage,153 the risk that 
one store will experience a burglary this Friday is independent of whether 
another will.  The insurer is able to successfully spread the risk across the 
pool and across time; 90 percent may be burgled within ten years, but only 
five percent will be this month.
In contrast, some risks are correlated with a set of other similar risks.  
The risk your Los Angeles home will be destroyed by an earthquake is 
correlated with whether your neighbor’s will be, not because your loss
causes your neighbor’s in any way, but because both losses come from a 
single cause – an earthquake.  Natural disasters are highly correlated, and 
difficult to “uncorrelate” because those who are not at high risk do not seek 
to transfer their risk.  An insurer covering earthquake risk in California, for 
example, cannot spread the concentrated California risk with policyholders 
in Iowa because Iowans will not bother with earthquake coverage.154
exposures, choose to do without coverage because of the cost.”  Id. (quoting the 
president of the Council of Insurance Agents & Brokers, Ken A. Crerar).
152 Id.
153 See, e.g., Foremost Ins. Co. v. Putzier, 606 P.2d 987 (Idaho 1980); Foremost Ins. 
Co. v. Putzier (Antonio Guanche), 627 P.2d 317 (Idaho 1981).
154 See discussion of uninsurable earthquake risks, supra¸ at __.  “An insurer will 
face this problem if it has many eggs in one [precarious] basket—if, for example, 
the insurer provides earthquake coverage mainly to homes in Los Angeles County 
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War is perhaps the ultimate correlated clash event.155  Over time, most 
policyholders in a warring region will suffer losses across most types of 
insurance.156  War is not insurable, but then terrorism is not quite war.  In 
particular, smaller isolated terrorist attacks like car bombs would not be 
correlated because too few people and buildings would be affected.  Any 
large or coordinated series of attacks, however, would be highly correlated.  
This difference helps to explain the threshold trigger found in the ISO
terrorism exclusion.157
Second, large terrorism attacks have a high probability of being a 
“clash event.” In insurance taxonomy clash events are those that do enough 
damage to affect multiple areas of insurance, thereby ruining insurers’ 
assumptions that high payout will not simultaneously be required for 
property, liability, life, health, and worker’s comp losses.  In addition to 
requiring an insurer to substantially increase its reserves, reinsurance may 
not be available for clash events.  The result of either of these problems is 
that clash events are simply too expensive to insure.  An irresponsible 
insurer could go bankrupt if multiple lines of insurance were implicated at 
once, but a responsible insurer would have to keep unusually high reserves, 
built out of unusually high premiums.
Third, in addition to being a clash event, terrorist attacks may result in 
a catastrophe.  This is not a reach for ever higher layers of hyperbole; a 
catastrophe is an event that results in large losses by involving large 
numbers of policyholders.  In strict insurance terms, a “catastrophe” is a 
disaster that causes more than $25 million in damages,” raised from $5 
million in 1997 by the American Insurance Services Group.158  Catastrophes 
therefore focus on loss amount alone, not on loss correlation, or “clash” 
across insurance lines.  A clash event is therefore likely to be catastrophic, 
rather than across the entire state of California.”  Kunreuther & Roth, PAYING THE 
PRICE, at 38.  To find those States where quakephobes should live, including Iowa, 
go to <<http://eqhazmaps.usgs.gov/html/graphics.html>>.  
155 See Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 609 A.2d 440, 471-
72 (N.J.Super.A.D.,1992) (“It is difficult to devise an actuarial guide for properly 
determining the amount of [war] premiums.  Moreover, the perils of war are so great 
that insurers are often reluctant to undertake such insurance risks.  An insurance 
company clearly has the right to limit its liability for risks associated with war hazards.”) 
(internal citations omitted).
156 See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11: Myriad 
Claims, Multiple Lines, Arguments Over Occurrence Counting War Risk 
Exclusions, The Future of Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues of Government 
Role, 37 Tort & Ins. L.J. 817, 843-44 (2002).
157 See discussion supra at __.
158
 Russell, IT’S A DISASTER at 7. 
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but not all catastrophes will be clash events.  The destruction of a small 
hospital, for example, might be a non-catastrophic clash event.
Catastrophic events are too costly to tempt voluntary coverage by 
insurance companies.  The World Trade Center had layers of insurance 
involving dozens of insurers because no individual company wanted to take 
on the risk.  Without reinsurance, no insurer would have been willing to play 
at all.  Taking on a potentially catastrophic risk without sufficient 
reinsurance is betting the company.
Finally, the terrorism risk parallels other catastrophic risks in
adverse selection, which likewise increases the need for high reserves.  As 
with most natural disasters, only those above a certain risk level are likely to 
buy terrorism insurance.  Large businesses in New York and Washington, 
D.C. will be much more inclined to buy than businesses in Detroit or 
Miami.159 Smaller businesses seem disinclined to purchase coverage at all.
Nearly 60 percent of brokers responding to [a Council of 
Insurance Agents and Brokers] survey said fewer than 
10 percent of their small commercial property/casualty 
accounts and fewer than 20 percent of medium-sized 
accounts have purchased the terrorism coverage offered 
to them by insurers.  Of the brokers handling large 
accounts, 48 percent said fewer than 1 in 5 of the biggest 
customers have [sic] brought terrorism coverage.160
This by itself does not necessarily make coverage impossible, but it does 
severely limit an insurer’s ability to spread the risk across policyholders
Adverse selection typically occurs when insurers cannot distinguish 
between higher and lower risk policyholders, charging all types the same 
price.  This will be a problem with terrorism  is Chicago at lower risk than 
D.C., and by how much?  But insurers will be able to make some 
distinctions, charging less in Detroit than New York, for example.  
However, because terrorism insurance will either be expensive or extremely 
limited, those who can be identified as low risk are unlikely to buy at all, 
even at a lowered price.  In a sense, an insurer is left with the entire Florida 
159 See Jack P. Gibson, “Terrorism Insurance Update 2003,” International Risk 
Management Institute, Inc., Insights (June 2003) available at 
<<http://www.irmi.com/insights/articles/gibson015.asp>> (as of Nov. 18, 2003) 
(“[M]any businesspeople around the country have concluded that [terrorism] is a 
problem only for Washington, D.C., New York, and trophy buildings such as 
stadiums and convention centers.  Thus, they believe that it won’t happen to 
them.”).
160 Id.
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coast wanting hurricane insurance, and none of the Midwest.  The history of 
natural disaster insurance teaches that this limited, high risk pool may not be 
able to attract private insurance without subsidies.
Adverse selection can be substantially removed if all relevant 
policyholders are pressed to purchase coverage. The agent of this 
persuasion could be the government, insurers, or lenders.  Under certain 
state-subsidized insurance programs for natural disasters, for example,
purchasing the insurance is a prerequisite for receiving state aid after a 
disaster.161  This approach would be politically untenable if applied to many 
low-risk regions of the country; if, for example, Madison, Wisconsin suffers 
a terrorist attack, state or federal aid will not be withheld because businesses 
there declined insurance coverage.  This may be true in part because the 
country’s judgment will be that residents and businesses there faced a low 
risk, and did not behave irresponsibly by not buying coverage.  
Even in known disaster areas, however, residents who fail to insure 
their homes from flood or earthquake often retain the public’s sympathy 
after an “unexpected” catastrophe. It has long been recognized that under 
certain circumstances the government cannot credibly threaten to withhold 
aid in the event of a disaster.162  While it is generally true that 
“governmental provision of insurance could act as a check on the temptation 
to hand out compensation indiscriminately and at no cost to its recipients,” 
the ability of the federal government to commit to no post-terrorism aid is 
highly doubtful.163
If the government cannot commit, nothing in TRIA or general 
insurance law forbids an insurer from requiring its policyholders to 
purchase terrorism coverage as a standard part of a commercial property 
policy.164  Given how few policyholders are choosing to purchase terrorism 
161
 Russell, IT’S A DISASTER at 43.
162 Jack Hirshleifer, War Damage Insurance, 35 Rev. Econ. Stat. 144 (1953), 
reprinted in 9 Conn. Ins. L.J. 1, 6 (2002) (arguing that in the absence of a 
nationwide war insurance program, the government could not keep itself from 
providing ex post relief); see also, Thomas C. Schelling, THE STRATEGY OF 
CONFLICT (1960) (exploring the problem of political commitment).  See also, Saul 
Levmore, Coalitions and Quakes: Disaster Relief and Its Prevention, 3 U. Chi. 
Roundtable 1, 18-19 [check] (1996). 
163
 Peter Siegelman, A New Old Look at Terrorism Insurance: Jack Hirshleifer’s 
War Damage Insurance After Fifty Years, 9 Conn. Ins. L.J. 19, 25 (2002).
164 See Gibson, “Terrorism Insurance Update 2003,” supra at __.  (“While [TRIA] 
requires insurers to disclose the charge being made for TRIA coverage, it does not 
specifically require the insurers to make purchasing the coverage optional.  Indeed, 
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coverage voluntarily, however, such a policy seems unlikely solve the 
adverse selection problem.  Those policyholders who do not want such 
coverage can easily go elsewhere in the thick insurance market to purchase 
coverage, without having to pay the increased premium that comes with 
terrorism coverage.  To date, no insurer has taken this route.
Banks, on the other hand, might carry a bigger stick in reducing 
adverse selection.  Terrorism insurance is currently a mortgage prerequisite 
is some high-risk locations.165  Banks are unlikely to extend this requirement 
to lower risk areas, however, thereby failing to solve the adverse selection 
problem.  In addition, if terrorism insurance were to become exceedingly 
rare after TRIA expires, banks involved in real estate lending would have to 
drop the requirement, or drop the business.166  For the foreseeable future, 
therefore, adverse selection will remain a problem.
Taken together, the extreme difficulty in calculating the terrorism 
risk, and the high cost of the risk’s structure make it both uninsurable and 
unprofitable.  As the next section reveals, government subsidy can solve 
unprofitability, but nothing short of time can hope to solve the insurability 
problem.
The Moderate Terrorism Risk
Moderate terrorism risks — a single car bombing or other limited
bombing — do not suffer from the same prohibitive problems of 
catastrophic risk.  The losses may fall on so few people or policyholders that 
correlation is not an issue.  Multiple lines of insurance could still be 
involved in a moderate clash event, but property destruction alone is also 
possible.  One of the few articles to fully address the feasibility of terrorism 
insurance concludes that after the initial shock to industry capacity, 
“exposures of a low to moderately large magnitude [would be] diversifiable 
and thus would be insurable . . . .”167
this isn’t even possible with workers compensation insurance because regulators do 
not allow terrorism to be excluded.”)
165 See, e.g., Omni Berkshire Corp. v. Wells Fargo Bank, 2004 WL 375954, *8 
(Mar. 1, 2004) (holding that lender can require hotel chain borrower to purchase 
separate terrorism coverage for $300,000 per year, under the “other insurance” 
clause of the loan).
166
 In circumstances where a type of insurance is desirable to a lender, but either 
impossible to find or prohibitively expensive, mortgage documents can limit the 
specific insurance requirement to circumstances where the insurance is 
“commercially available” or “commercially reasonable.”
167
 Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets: A Role for the 
Government as Insurer?, 36 Ind. L. Rev. 447, 448 (2003) (concluding that 
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The adverse selection data reveal, however, that policyholders are 
not interested in purchasing coverage for minor or moderate terrorism risks.  
Ironically, for the same reason that policyholders are uninterested in such 
coverage, insurers are willing to provide it.  The pre-TRIA terrorism 
exclusions showed that insurers did not want to cover catastrophic, nuclear, 
biological, or chemical attacks, but were willing to cover minor explosive 
attacks.  These attacks are not necessarily more easily calculated than other 
terrorist risks, but the results of miscalculation are minor.  
Insurers would still be guessing as to the frequency of such attacks, 
but as long as the frequency remained low, and the coverage excluded all 
but minor attacks, providing coverage could be less costly than losing 
policyholders.  And moderate explosive risks would be more diversifiable, if 
still incalculable, were policyholders to become willing to purchase 
insurance coverage for them.
Of the several articles to consider various aspects of terrorism 
insurance since September 11th, most assume arguendo that such insurance 
is feasible, but allow that limits on large losses will be necessary.  Saul 
Levmore and Kyle Logue present an intriguing vision of a crime insurance 
program similar to several government terrorism insurance programs, 
including TRIA. 168  Levmore and Logue consider the resilience of the 
insurance industry to previous shocks, such as Hurricane Andrew, and 
conclude that terrorism should fare no different.169  This position is not 
central to their analysis, however, and they admit that catastrophic terrorist 
risk is likely to be either excluded from the market or significantly pared 
down.170  By contrast, Gron and Sykes recognize that large-scale terrorism 
risks could easily remain uninsurable.171
V.  THE LESSONS OF OTHER CATASTROPHIC RISKS
A combination of time, government subsidy, and new scientific 
tools has brought several natural disaster risks back from the realm of 
uninsurability.  Do the histories of these risks differ from the unfolding 
government intervention in the terrorism insurance market is likely to be net 
detrimental).
168 Saul Levmore & Kyle Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism – and Crime, 
forthcoming (primarily assuming the feasibility of terrorism insurance, and 
concluding that a stronger case exists for government crime insurance than 
terrorism insurance).
169 Id. at __.  Compare with the discussion of Hurricane Andrew, supra at __.
170 Id. at __.  
171
 Gron & Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets, 36 Ind. L. Rev. at 454-55.
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history of terrorism in the United States?  A number have argued that 
terrorism is “simply another kind of catastrophe, a peril neither 
quantitatively nor qualitatively different from the various kinds of natural 
disasters.”172  “The insurance industry, in the main, does not share that view.  
From the perspective of most insurers, terrorism losses are not the 
equivalent of other kinds of catastrophic losses.”173 Some risk scholars have 
similarly concluded that although there are similarities between 9/11 and 
prior natural disasters, “there are also indications that the [9/11] response 
may not represent merely a temporary market disequilibrium.”174
An empirical analysis of insurance industry behavior in the aftermath 
of non-terrorist “shock” events provides some insight into what may be in 
store for a private terrorism insurance market.  The search for a parallel 
disaster begins with a few plausible candidates: floods, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, and war.  
A disaster, natural or unnatural, can be defined as “an event that 
affects many people or a wide geographical area all at one time.”175
Disasters are also often clash events affecting multiple areas of insurance
simultaneously.
Disasters are, by their nature, exceptions to rules and trends.  
They’re what statisticians call outlier events.  They’re 
useful in developing trends, but they don’t conform to the 
parameters of trends.  For this reason, insurance companies 
usually exclude disasters from standard policies—or 
minimize the coverage they do offer so much that 
172
 Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Terrorism, and 9/11: Reflections on Three 
Threshold Questions, 9 Conn. Ins. L. J. 95, 103 (2002) (focusing on the ability of 
the industry to pay for most losses).  See also, Levmore & Logue, Insuring Against 
Terrorism – And Crime, forthcoming.
173
 Jerry, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 1067.  Jerry goes on to argue that, 
despite the industry’s current views, smaller, more manageable types of terrorism 
risk might be eventually found to be insurable.  
174 J. David Cummins & Christopher M. Lewis, Catastrophic Events, Parameter 
Uncertainty and the Breakdown of Implicit Long-Term Contracting: The Case of 
Terrorism Insurance, 26:2/3 J. Risk & Uncertainty 153, 154 (2003).  Cummins & 
Lewis are first seeking information about the rise and fall of insurer stock prices 
after an industry-wide “loss shock”.  Their study and conclusions reveal, however, 
deep related data about how insurers respond to such loss in terms of providing 
future coverage.
175
 David T. Russell, IT’S A DISASTER: THE MONEY AND POLITICS THAT FOLLOW
EARTHQUAKES, HURRICANES AND OTHER CATASTROPHIC LOSES, 5 (1999).
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consumers are fairly tempted to avoid the insurance and 
take their chances.176
Natural disasters are the original paradigm of cat risk and account 
for most of the market, and most of the losses, most of the time.177  The total 
natural disaster insured loss for the rough period from 1980 to 1992 was 
around $25 billion.178  By the end of the 1990s, insurers began to prepare for 
the possibility of natural disaster losses in the range of $50 to $100 billion 
for one year, not one decade. A combination of explosive population 
growth in natural disaster areas  California and coastal Florida  together 
with a growing recognition of the recurrence of natural disasters, account for 
much of the increase in perceived risk in the cat market.
Non-natural disasters, meaning intentional or man-made disasters, 
have been getting progressively more expensive as well.  Attitudes about 
catastrophic risk and the structure of the cat risk market were changing 
rapidly in the decade leading up to 9/11.  While the insured loss from the 
New York portion of 9/11, at $50 to $55 billion, constituted an exponential 
jump from the previous highest loss, the numbers were already on an 
incline.  The 90s had brought the Los Angeles Riots (1992), the World 
Trade Center bombing (1993), and the Oklahoma City bombing (1995), 
with accompanying insured losses of $775 million, $510 million, and $125 
million.179
In a relatively brief period of time, then, the insurers and reinsurers 
responsible for bearing cat risks realized they were undercapitalized.  
Reinsurers raised rates by one hundred percent or more.180  Insurers sought 
to raise rates as well, both to pass on the higher cost of reinsurance and 
increase their own reserves, but state insurance commissioners limited these 
attempts.  Rate increases must be submitted to state commissioners for 
approval, modification, or denial.  In the face of limited permitted increases, 
some insurers chose to exit the market in lieu of providing coverage at state-
approved rates.  
176 Id. at 24 (1999). When consumers “take their chances,” they take two chances: 
the chance that disaster won’t strike them, and the chance that the government will 
bail them out if it does.
177
“Of the top ten insured-loss disasters in United States history,” before September 
11, 2001, “weather has accounted for eight . . . and certainly contributed to nine . . . 
of the ten.”  The Northridge Earthquake of 1994 is the exception to the original ten. 
178 Russell, IT’S A DISASTER at 24.
179 Id.
180
 Christopher M. Lewis & Kevin C. Murdock, Alternative Means of Redistributing 
Catastrophic Risk in a National Risk-Management System, in THE FINANCING OF 
CATASTROPHE RISK 52 (Kenneth A. Froot , ed. 1999).
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In high risk areas, like coastal Florida, insurer exit was too rapid and
common for the state’s taste; the state intervened by regulating the exit 
process.  Florida, like California, began state insurance programs to pick up 
some of the risk, but the insurance industry still considered itself 
overexposed.  The evaluation point of such programs is not necessarily the 
limited load reinsurers and insurers can bear.  The question is whether those 
limits can be expanded.  If they cannot, or not in the medium term, or 
potential expansion will be hampered by a government reinsurance program, 
TRIA-based successors are a poor idea.  
There are similarities between terrorism, natural disasters, and war.  
Natural disasters and terrorism, when insured, cause “loss shocks” by
unexpected, expensive, industry-wide insured losses.  The first immediate 
result is the large loss of capital, or reserve.181  Second, there is an initial and 
then ongoing reevaluation of the risk of similar future events.  Third, as the 
chart below illustrates, all three disaster types can be catastrophic, correlated 
clash events.
181
 The funds are not paid out to policyholders immediately, of course.  The 
complete extent of the 9/11 losses, let alone those that were insured losses, or by 
which company they will be paid, remains unresolved well into 2003.  Knowledge 
that there will be extensive payments, however, freezes an insurer’s capital from 
other non-investment use, immediately depleting the insurer’s reserve for all other 
future losses.
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Comparison of Disaster Insurability
War
Mega-Catastrophe
Clash Event
Correlated
Actuarial Data Useless
Non-Random
Time Concentrated
Incalculable
Terrorism
Catastrophic (possible)
Clash Event (probable)
Correlated
Adverse Selection
No Actuarial Data
Intentional / Targeted
Time Concentrated (possible)
Large Risks Incalculable
Natural Disasters
Catastrophic (possible)
Clash Event (possible)
Correlated
Adverse Selection
Strong Actuarial Data
Random
Time Spread
Calculable
Despite the similarities, terrorism attacks differ from catastrophic 
natural disasters in three fundamental respects.  These differences stem from 
the random or non-intentional nature of natural disasters and the purposive 
nature of terrorism.  First is the now familiar fact that natural disasters can 
be predicted using history and science, while terrorist attacks in America 
cannot.  The human planning component denies more than the grossest of 
predictions as to timing or severity of attacks.  
Second, acts of terrorism are not distributed randomly across time.  
“Massive terrorism losses, for example, could occur in close succession 
temporally.”182 Terrorist may prefer a devastating cascade, maximizing 
psychological impact and stretching law enforcement thin.  “Past experience 
strongly suggests that this is highly unlikely to occur with respect to natural 
disasters.”183 A terrorist period therefore has a much greater chance of 
becoming a mega-catastrophe than does a natural disaster.  
Third, catastrophic natural disasters follow relatively random paths; 
a tornado will land in a field as soon as it will land in a town.  Terrorists, by 
contrast, will aim for densely populated areas and valuable property.184
Terrorism is therefore neither random across time or place.  These three 
differences culminate in the ultimate difference: most natural disasters can 
be predicted, but terrorism cannot.
182
 Jerry, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW 1067.
183 Id.
184
 There is an exception to this dichotomy, in that hurricanes also “aim” for what 
are now the densely populated coastal areas of a few states, where residents have 
come to the nuisance.  Of course, it is still random whether a potentially 
catastrophic storm lands in a populated area, or makes landfall at all.
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Natural Disasters
The early assumption has been that if natural disasters are insurable, 
terrorism must be insurable as well.185 Many of the risk distribution 
problems raised by terrorism can also be found in natural disasters, yet many 
natural disasters are insurable.  Three main distinctions explain the 
difference.  First, actuarial data exist.  Second, the fair price for natural 
disaster insurance is often slightly too expensive for the market, but not so 
excessive as to preclude government subsidy of premiums.  Third, natural 
disasters are not concentrated in time, space, or intentionally maximized 
destruction.
Flood
Ninety percent of all natural disasters are floods.186  Flood damage 
and mudslides account for a significant percentage of home damage each 
year, but are excluded from ordinary homeowners policies.  Flood insurance 
was available for brief periods in the late 1890s and the mid-1920s.187
Despite the 1936 Flood Control Act and the creation of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, the flood risk in the United States eventually reached the 
point of ongoing uninsurability.188
The primary problem for flood insurance is cost, not calculation.  
Increased development in flood-prone areas combine with a strong bias in 
who selects flood coverage, resulting in a high-cost, poor risk spread.  It is 
the “impossibility of making this line of insurance self-supporting due to the 
refusal of the public to purchase such insurance at the rates which would 
have to be charged to pay annual losses” that led to failure of the private 
flood insurance market.189
But it was not always the case that profitability was the only cause 
of flood insurability.  Today, actuarial data based on history and scientific 
analysis of groundwater movement provides reasonably accurate 
predictions.  Before the creation of usable data by the federal government, 
however, “the costs associated with conducting the hydrological studies . . .
185 See e.g., Jerry, Insurance, Terrorism, and 9/11, 9 CONN. INS. L. J. at 103.
186
 Russell, IT’S A DISASTER at 9.
187
 Howard Kunreuther, Insurability Conditions and the Supply of Coverage, in 
PAYING THE PRICE 40 (Kunreuther & Roth, Sr., eds., 1998).
188
 Flood Control Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.
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 Insurance Executive Assoc., Report on Floods and Flood Damage (1952).
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and the nationwide scope of the effort,” coupled with an indifferent public, 
made the creation of the necessary actuarial data unattractive for insurers.190
In 1968 Congress took action, having found that “many factors 
ha[d] made it uneconomic for the private insurance industry alone to make 
flood insurance available to those in need of such protection on reasonable 
terms and conditions.”191  In response, the National Flood Insurance 
Program was created.192 FEMA (“Federal Emergency Management 
Agency”) runs the Program and provides a regulated, standard flood 
insurance policy.  The Program has undergone numerous mutations since its 
enactment, with government subsidized premiums as the point of 
consistency.193 The Flood Program was enacted in the hope that private 
insurance would be able to take part in the flood insurance market.  At 
times, private insurers have taken part in name only: including the coverage 
in their policies under the Program, but carrying none of the risk.  The 
program has grown increasingly successful, and today only 35 percent of 
Program policies are subsidized.  These subsidized policies represent the 
highest risk areas, and coverage remains limited, but private insurers are 
productively participating in the market.
The history lesson of flood insurance is that government can be 
useful in solving either cause of uninsurability.  Unremarkably, the 
profitability problem can be addressed by subsidizing premiums.  In rarer 
instances, the calculation problem can be aided or resolved by the gathering 
of national data and the work of government scientists.  
This lesson has limited application in the terrorism insurance 
context, unfortunately.  To the extent the government has data about natural 
security, central information will be withheld for security purposes, and 
much information will develop too quickly to allow for reasonable use by 
insurers.  Moreover, with or without a national terrorism insurance program, 
the federal government will gather and analyze terrorist risk data.  This 
analysis may eventually make it less costly for insurers to attempt to predict 
the risk, but it cannot make an unpredictable risk predictable.  
190
 Edward T. Pasterick, The National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE 
PRICE 128 (Kunreuther & Roth, Sr., eds., 1998).
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 National Flood Insurance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4001(d) (2000).
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 National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4128 (2000).
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National Flood Insurance Program, in PAYING THE PRICE Ch. 6 (Kunreuther & 
Roth, Sr., eds., 1998).
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Hurricanes
In contrast to flood insurance, the more recent history of hurricane 
insurance has been the weakening of a once independent market into one 
where insurers stay only because they are forced to do so, or because they 
are not forced to bear the cost alone.  “Today there is a question as to 
whether the voluntary insurance market can provide affordable coverage to 
customers who seek it and still ensure the long-term solvency of firms in the 
industry.” 194 Hurricane insurance is important in a few locations, most 
notably Florida.  The damage from windstorms and tornados caused by 
hurricanes is covered under most standard property policies.  Hurricane-
caused flood damage is covered, if at all, under flood policies.  
As with flood coverage, hurricanes primarily raise one insurability 
hurdle — profitability.  The profitability problem is handled by a 
combination of subsidy and forced market participation.  Hurricane risk is 
calculable enough that it does not threaten insurability.  However, gross 
miscalculations did cause Florida insurers to suffer large reserve losses after 
Hurricane Andrew hit in 1992.  Moreover, a combination of changing global 
weather patterns, increased understanding of weather patterns, and the 
explosion of the Florida coastal population has caused insurers to 
dramatically increase predictions of loss frequency and cost.195
Most insurers tried either to exit the Florida market or to raise their 
premiums after Hurricane Andrew.  Fearing the decimation of the hurricane 
insurance market, “Florida lawmakers . . . passed a moratorium—emergency 
legislation that prevented insurance companies from non-renewing more 
than five percent of their policyholders in any given year.”196 The nine 
insurers to become insolvent as a result of Andrew were “allowed” to exit 
the market completely, and some number of others were able to exit before 
the moratorium.197  To provide insurance for those without, Florida 
expanded its Joint Underwriting Association (JUA), thereby providing basic 
coverage, but at increased rates.198
Still, “[a]s was the case with [Hurricane] Andrew and the peril of 
windstorm, the events of September 11, 2001 are leading to permanent 
194
 Eugene LeComte & Karen Gahagan, Hurricane Insurance Protection in Florida, 
in PAYING THE PRICE 97 (Kunreuther & Roth, Sr., eds., 1998).
195 Id. at 99-104.
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changes in the underwriting and pricing of terrorism risk.”199  Extending the 
parallel with terrorism insurance, Florida developed subsidies and limits on 
policyholders payment to keep from driving now captive insurers into 
bankruptcy.200 However, Florida had to take more drastic measures than 
Congress may be willing to take.  Nor is the national insurance industry 
likely to sit still for the forced provision of insurance coupled with the 
forced presence in the insurance market.
The historical lesson of hurricane insurance is that a working market 
can become unworkable when the cost of the risk is first underestimated, 
and then found to be more than the public is willing to pay.  Numerous 
parallels can be drawn between the shock of Hurricane Andrew and 9/11.  
However the parallels are again of limited value as the impact of the initial 
shock fades, the fact remains that the hurricane risk can be calculated and 
the terrorism risk cannot.  
Earthquakes
Earthquakes are similar to the terrorism threat is that only those in 
high risk areas purchase coverage.  In addition, state intervention in the 
insurance market came in response to one particular disaster.  Second only 
to Hurricane Andrew, the 1994 California Northridge earthquake was the 
most expensive insured natural disasters ever.201 The quake caused 
approximately $20 million in damage, $12.5 million of it insured.  Despite 
possible losses like this, earthquake damage is not included in common 
homeowners insurance because of a consistent lack of demand.  The risk of 
earthquakes, and their range of intensity, varies widely, and so the cost of 
earthquake insurance is highly variable. It can be purchased as an optional 
endorsement in most states because it can be profitably insured.  
In California, where the risk is greatest, a separate insurance policy 
for earthquake losses can be purchased from the California Earthquake 
Authority (CEA).  The CEA provides earthquake insurance under a program 
structured similarly to the National Flood Program; the policy is provided 
199
 Robert P. Hartwig, Insurance Information Institute, One Hundred Minutes of 
Terror that Changed the Global Insurance Industry Forever, at 29, available at 
<<http://www.iii.org/media/hottopics/insurance/sept11/sept11paper/>>.  “The scars 
of Hurricane Andrew . . . are still very visible throughout the non-life insurance and 
reinsurance industry.  Insurers charge much high[er] premiums in coastal zones, 
require special windstorm deductibles, and sometimes require separate windstorm 
policies underwriting by special windstorm pools.” Id. at 23.
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for an additional premium through ordinary insurance companies, but the 
risk is borne by the CEA.  “CEA resources include the premium revenue 
from policyholders and up to $10.5 billion from assessments on insurers, 
reinsurance coverage, and lines of credit to be repaid from future 
premiums.”202
California law requires insurers to offer earthquake insurance as part 
of their homeowners policies.  “Following the Northridge earthquake, 90 
percent of insurance providers in the state either stopped selling any kind of 
homeowners insurance or significantly scaled back their underwriting.”203
The state-subsidized CEA made it possible for insurers to once again 
provide homeowners insurance in California without exposing themselves to 
a second catastrophic risk comparable to the Northridge quake.
For most of the nineties, none of California’s primary homeowners 
insurers chose to provide private, non-CEA earthquake coverage.204  In 
1998, Pacific Select Insurance Company began to offer earthquake
insurance with more coverage,205 and higher premiums, than the CEA.  A 
CEA representative expressed concern that Pacific Select would “cherry-
pick” the market by covering lower risks, leaving higher risk properties to 
the captive CEA.206  An empirical analysis of the outcome to date has not 
been done, but the concern is legitimate.  In fact, this should be a concern 
about any potential changes to the statutory scheme under which terrorism 
insurance is provided. Government participation in an insurance market in 
the form of subsidy for the worst risks will necessarily either have to 
monopolize the market — forbid “cherry-picking” — or suffer from moral 
hazard.207
Earthquake insurance in California may become a successful mix of 
necessary government subsidy and limited private insurance.  Again, 
however, this outcome seems promising because the insurability problem in 
California is one of sheer cost, not incalculability.  The CEA and insurers 
202
 Russell, IT’S A DISASTER at 135.  
203 Id. at 136.
204 Id. at 138.
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use structural engineers to create seismic models; the models have limits, 
but also predictive power.  The lesson from this insurance market is that if a 
risk can be modeled, government subsidies for high risks open up a niche 
for private insurers in the moderate risk range.  A catastrophic risk of one 
type may not privately insurable, but a more moderate risk of the same type 
can be.
This seems to be the strongest hope for the private terrorism 
insurance market.  With acceptable limits and deductibles, insurers should
be able to cover the limited car-bomb risk, for example.  Assuming such 
attacks remain rare, even without actuarial data, insurers can meet the risk 
without a substantial reserve increase.  Indeed, insurers retained this low 
level of attack in ordinary commercial policies by writing a triggering 
threshold into the currently prohibited terrorism exclusions.
War
Terrorism shares elements with natural disasters, but it more closely 
resembles war as a risk.  While some natural disasters are insurable, it is 
widely accepted that war is not.208  War creates the “perfect storm” of 
actuarial nightmares:  a correlated, catastrophic, ongoing clash event.209
208
“The purpose of the war risk exclusion is to prevent insurers from being wiped 
out by correlated claims . . . that inflict abnormal losses throughout society.”  
Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11: Myriad Claims, 
Multiple Lines, Arguments Over Occurrence Counting War Risk Exclusions, The 
Future of Terrorism Coverage, and New Issues of Government Role¸ 37 Tort & Ins. 
L.J. 817, 852 (2002).  Courts rarely handle the war exclusion, but when it matters, 
courts acknowledge that the purpose of the clause “is not insidious or difficult to 
understand.”  Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 98 A.2d 134, 139 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1953).  “The clear weight of authority, both among the judiciary and the 
actuaries, is to the effect that the hazard of war is indeterminable and cannot be 
calculated for premium-paying purposes.”  Robert B. Billings, Of War Clauses, 
1952 Ins. L.J. 793, 797.  
The U.S. military provides life and health insurance for military personnel, 
including those involved in combat.  Additional life and health insurance can be 
purchased by members of the military, but the policies will exclude the risks arising 
from war or military activity.  
209
 Of course, this does not mean that war cannot be “insured” by the government 
under a public transfer program.  The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, now repealed, 
gave the Secretary of Transportation the ability to issue insurance for those risks 
excluded under ordinary aviation policies, including war.  49 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1542 
(1970).  A government policy was in place for Pan Am Flight 083 when it was 
hijacked by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and destroyed in 
Egypt, emptied of passengers.  The court determined that the war risk exclusion in 
Pan Am’s primary policy did not apply, so that Pan Am’s ordinary insurers had to 
cover the loss; had it decided otherwise, the government would have had to pay out 
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Terrorist attacks have the capacity to rise to this description, but terrorist 
attacks can also take the form of one car bomb, one building, and few 
deaths.  Therefore, “[a]lthough terrorist initiatives make normal loss 
prediction much more difficult, they do not pose the same risk calculation 
and risk distribution problems presented by more dispersed, semi-constant 
war.”210
War is assumed to be a “mega-catastrophe” — one that exceeds 
industry capacity to respond. 211 Of course, certain types of war, like certain 
types of terrorism, could be potentially insurable.  Wars vary in size and 
scope, and one can envision a short war in which losses are limited 
geographically; a few skirmishes in an evacuated city would result in limited 
loss to property and business.  Nonetheless, war is unlikely to remain 
contained enough to make coverage workable.  
We can be sure that terrorist attacks on the United States are more
likely than war to be containable.  But we do not know if the next terrorist 
attack, or the next five, will resemble the first World Trade Center car 
bombing, or the last World Trade Center destruction.  Moreover, war far 
exceeds the level of correlated destruction necessary to make a risk 
uninsurable; the future of terrorism losses in the United States need not 
approach the level of a war to bring with it the hardships of correlated clash 
events.
In sum, terrorism approaches the risk status of war, but remains, 
thus far, well behind.  On the other hand, the fact that some level of 
terrorism could be insured does not mean that unlimited terrorism insurance 
will ever be possible.  The war exclusion itself does not exclude terrorism.  
under its “war risk” policy.  See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 505 F.2d 989, 995 (2d Cir. 1974).  The government-issued policy covers losses 
from “[w]ar, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities (whether war be declared 
or not), civil war, rebellion, revolution or insurrection, military or usurped 
power . . . by any government or public or local authority or by any independent 
unit or individual engaged in irregular warfare.”  Id. at 996.
210
 Stempel, The Insurance Aftermath of September 11  ¸ 37 Tort & Ins. L.J. at 849 
(arguing that the war exclusions in place on September 11, 2001, should not exclude 
terrorism losses).
211 There is a cautionary lesson from the war exclusion that will not be explored 
here:  those terrorism exclusions permitted by state insurance commissions should 
be understood by policyholders and interpreted by courts in keeping with the 
actuarial function of the exclusion.  The settled precedent on the war exclusion fails 
to track the exclusion’s intended function  the exclusion of a particular class of 
incalculable risk  and instead tracks the courts’ conception of a policyholder’s 
expectation of the clause, even if that expectation is divorced from the insurance 
context in which the clause was drafted. 
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The House Financial Services Committee went so far as to send a letter to 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners explaining that the 
use of bellicose language by the government was not to be taken as an 
assertion of actual war capable of triggering the war exclusion.212  The 
language of the war exclusion supports this conclusion, and it is true that 
“[t]he risk pool maintenance function of the war risk exclusion is not 
imperiled when it does not bar coverage for what is essentially an isolated 
crime, albeit one with political overtones.”213  But it is not true that risk 
pooling will not be imperiled by future terrorist attacks of a similar 
magnitude.  The war exclusion need not apply to terrorist attacks to maintain 
a healthy risk pool, but some type of terrorism exclusion might.214
Could terrorism in the United States be a disaster of the insurable 
kind?  It could, in the sense that some terrorism attacks could easily be non-
catastrophic.  If actuarial data became available to price meaningful 
premiums, insurance for terrorism losses might resemble earthquake 
insurance (outside of California) more than flood insurance.  In addition, 
non-insurable causes of likely catastrophic loss can be made insurable by 
deductions and payment limits; whether such limited terrorism insurance 
would be marketable is another question.  Thus far, the demand for non-
catastrophic terrorism insurance has been miniscule.  
VI.  THE DANGERS OF PRETENDING 
Under the TRIA program we have a form of terrorism 
compensation.  However imperfect, one might wonder if it would truly be 
better to allow the program to lapse, resulting in substantially less — and
more limited — coverage.  Weighing benefits that can be had by other 
means against unique harms reveals that the pretense of terrorism insurance 
does more harm than good.  
First, it should be remembered that the federal government can 
compensate Americans for terrorism losses without using the insurance 
industry as a conduit.  
212 See Officials Ponder Reopening of Reagan Airport, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Sept. 
19, 2001 at A7.  
213 Id. at 852.
214 See id. at 862 (arguing that if terrorism risks are to be excluded, a separate 
terrorism exclusion is would be needed).
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Second, the ordinary public policy gains expected from insurance 
do not come under TRIA, and so cannot be lost.  Until insurers can 
meaningfully price premiums, and the payout expected in the event of a 
terrorist loss is in fact insurance as opposed to relief payment, there is no 
cause to mourn the loss of incentives to businesses that would come from 
true terrorism insurance.  In addition, the ubiquitous danger of moral hazard 
may create dire incentives for policyholders to take less care avoiding 
terrorism loss.
Third, given that some private insurance for minor to moderate 
terrorism risks may be available in the future, the tendency of government-
subsidized insurance to “crowd out” developing private markets is a 
concern.  This concern is especially sharp where the federal subsidies are 
coupled with state-enforced artificially low premiums.
A.  THE DOWNSIDE OF INSURANCE WITHOUT THE ADVANTAGE
Efficient incentives can only be given by an accurate signal about 
costs and benefits.  At least three sources distort the signals being sent by 
insurers under TRIA: highly subsidized catastrophic coverage, mere 
educated guesses about how much to charge for mandatory coverage, and 
artificial price limits placed on terrorism premiums by states. Policyholders 
may well respond to these insurance incentives, but the response is only as 
strong as the underlying information embedded in the price.  
State regulators delayed scrutinizing terrorism premiums for a year, 
but the grace period has ended.215 One of the country’s largest insurers, 
American International Group (AIG), is now struggling with state insurance
commissioners in 15 to 20 States.216 Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, New 
Hampshire, Tennessee, and Texas have denied AIG the right to charge the 
premiums AIG calculated.217  Denial can lead to further negotiation (Texas), 
215
 “State regulators nationwide are reviewing terrorism surcharges for the first 
time” at the beginning of 2004.  Gethan Ward, Tennessee says AIG’s terror rate is 
excessive, TENNESSEAN, Mar. 31, 2004, at E: Business.
216
 Dennis Kelly, Update: State Regulators Say AIG Terrorism Surcharges 
Excessive, BEST’S INSURANCE NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WL 
61249565.
217 Id.  States review insurance rates at different times in the insurance process.  
Texas, for example, which requires approval of a rate before it can be charged, is in 
negotiations with AIG after denying several rate requests.  Tennessee permits 
insurers to begin charging premiums, but can retroactively disapprove rates, as it 
has now done with AIG.  Arkansas first approved AIG’s rate, and then disapproved 
it retroactively, requiring AIG to refund the difference between the charged rate and 
the approved rate to its policyholders.  Id.
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litigation (Florida), an agency hearing (Tennessee), acceptance of the lower 
rate by the insurer (possibly Arkansas), or exit from that state’s market.  If 
the denial comes after the rate has already been charged to policyholders, 
insurers are often required to refund the difference. 
Additional states have yet to rule on whether AIG, and other 
insurers, can charge their chosen terrorism premiums.  Because TRIA 
requires AIG to continue to offer terrorism coverage with or without state 
approval of a rate increase for the terrorism portion of the policy, a delayed 
approval amounts to a denial of a requested increase for the waiting 
period.218
In states where rate increases are directly or effectively denied, the 
price signal sent by terrorism-specific premium will be artificially low.219
The reinsurance subsidy provided by TRIA deepens this effect.  The 
depressed price does more than weaken incentives for a particular 
policyholder, it sends an inaccurate signal about the risk and cost of 
terrorism to the general public.
There is evidence that even unsophisticated individual consumers 
make better risk decisions when aware of appropriately priced insurance in 
the market, even if those individuals do not purchase the insurance 
themselves.220  Insurance prices provide one of the most obvious, and 
potentially meaningful, indications of the likelihood of an event and the size 
of its loss.  And insurance prices are easy to find and easy to understand.
People have a hard time accurately predicting or perceiving 
potential loss.221  The chance of scary risks may be inflated in a person’s 
mind because the impact of its occurrence is greater, or a small risk may be 
minimized to zero so as to pare down the universe of risks the mind must 
218
 Alaska, Virginia, and Idaho were evaluating requested rate changes at the time of 
writing.  Dennis Kelly, Update: State Regulators Say AIG Terrorism Surcharges 
Excessive, BEST’S INSURANCE NEWS, Apr. 1, 2004, available at 2004 WL 
61249565.
219
 This assumes, of course, that insurers are not simply “padding the premiums and 
blaming it on 9/11,” as one insurance agent has charged.  Id. (quoting Jack Spann, 
an insurance agent in Tennessee).  Policyholders have two options that cast 
skepticism on this interpretation; policyholders can decline the added terrorism 
coverage, as many do, or they can switch insurers in the competitive markets where 
terrorism coverage is more desirable, such as Northern Virginia or Florida.
220
 See Susan K. Laury & Melayne Morgan McInnes, The Impact of Insurance 
Prices on Decision Making Biases: An Experimental Analysis, 70:2 J. Risk & Ins. 
219-233 (2003).
221 See Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky ed., Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1982).
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consider.222  We may expect large commercial ventures to do a better job if 
their risk -calculation process gathers relatively more information and 
attempts to temper the first automatic human response to data.  Nonetheless, 
in an area where the necessary information is just not known, risk managers 
for even the most sophisticated commercial venture will have to take the 
information that is at hand, and guess.  
This guess will include the timing, magnitude, and distribution of a 
future terrorist attack. Susan K. Laury and Melayne Morgan McInnes argue 
that “[i]f the relative prices of insurance contracts correctly reflect the 
relative probability of loss, the price of each contract may be an important 
signal of the risk of each activity.”223  In an attempt to determine if the 
information found in insurance prices would bring decisionmaking more in 
line with Bayes’ Rule224, Laury and McInnes conducted a series of 
experiments.225
Participants in these experiments observed a series of orange and 
white balls being drawn, with replacement, from two cups.  Cup A had four 
orange balls and two white, and Cup B had three orange and three white.  
The roll of a die determined from which cup the balls in successive 
drawings came; as the balls were drawn, they were shown to the participant, 
who then had to guess from which cup the balls had been drawn.  Guess 
correctly, keep the $23 you have been given; guess incorrectly, lose $14, 
keeping only $9.
Participants guessed in one of three environments:  no insurance 
option, known insurance prices but no ability to buy insurance, and 
insurance that could be (and often was) bought.  The price of the insurance, 
which paid the full loss of $14 if the participant chose the wrong cup, was 
actuarially “fair,” which is to say that it reflected the percentage chance that 
choosing that cup would result in a loss.  
222
 Empirical evidence also shows that there is a cognitive bias toward 
overestimating small risks.  See W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Perceptions in Regulation, 
Tort Liability, and the Market, 14:4 Regulation (1991).  Why some risks are 
distorted downward and some upward is not understood.
223
 Laury & McInnes, The Impact of Insurance Prices, 70:2 J. Risk & Ins. at 220. 
224
 Bayes’ Rule can be used to explain how one should incorporate new information
in order to rationally update one’s conception of the probability of an event.  Bayes’ 
Rule “states that the probability that two events will both occur is equal to the 
probability of the first event occurring given that the second occurs, multiplied by the 
probability of the second occurring.”  Douglas Lichtman, Uncertainty and the 
Standard for Preliminary Relief, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 197, 213 (2003).
225 Id. at 221-224.  
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The resulting evidence supports the conclusion that people respond 
to the knowledge of insurance prices, even if the insurance cannot be 
purchased, by lessening reliance on potentially distorting heuristics.  
Accurate insurance prices led people to make decisions in a way that
decreased their risk of loss; knowing the price caused participants to make 
decisions more in line with the actual probabilities of loss.226
This tells us how people respond to accurate insurance pricing, but 
not how people respond to insurance prices that do not accurately reflect the 
probability of loss. There are two options.  First, the policyholder (or person 
aware of the price) will simply follow the information contained in the price.  
If the premium is too low, the risk will be underestimated, leading to 
behavior that increases the chance of loss.  If the premium is too high, the 
risk will be overestimated, leading to an inefficient avoidance of the loss.  In 
the terrorism context, where there is both subsidized reinsurance and 
potential state caps on terrorism premiums, the premium is likely to be too 
low.  The result will be an increase in risk taking, perhaps in something as 
simple as locating in Washington D.C., in lieu of Northern Virginia.227
The second option is that policyholders will ignore inaccurate 
premiums.  Laury and McInnes informed their participants that the 
insurance prices would be actuarially fair, perhaps making them more 
inclined to rely on the prices given.  Sophisticated businesses buying 
commercial insurance for a large property might be expected to view 
terrorism premiums as moderately distorted educated guesses.  Even so, a 
business faced with the terrorism risk could prefer following imprecise
information to nothing.  Under this second option, therefore, the incentive 
information is either useless because it is ignored, or harmful because it is 
inaccurate.
If TRIA does not provide useful market incentives as a whole, can it 
provide individual safety incentives to policyholders? “Insurance has an 
advantage over all other methods in the policy analyst’s tool kit in that it 
rewards individuals prior to a disaster for investing in loss reduction 
measures through lower premiums.”228 Insurers provide incentives to their 
policyholders to take appropriate risk avoidance and risk limitation steps.  A 
primary mechanism is “experience pricing,” or setting the policyholder’s 
premiums based both on their similarity to a group of policyholders and 
226 Id. at 224-226, 230-231.
227
 Of course, because life and fear are involved in avoiding harm from terrorist 
attacks, there are strong non-financial incentives.  Still, those who underestimate the 
risk may respond to financial incentives, and, as discussed above, artificially low 
premiums may misdirect policyholders about the level of risk.
228
 Hillman, Terrorism Insurance, U.S. GAO at 8.
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their individual actions.229  A policyholder can affect the premiums it pays 
by decreasing risky behavior.  
A related mechanism is refusing to insure a potential policyholder, 
refusing to renew a policyholder’s policy, or dropping a policyholder from 
certain coverage mid-policy year (for failing to comply with policy 
conditions).  Refusing to cover a particular risk for a policyholder is akin to 
changing the price of coverage, and assuming that the policyholder would 
be unwilling to pay the cost; for a premium close to the expected cost of the 
potential loss, for example, an insurer would provide coverage to those it 
otherwise refuses.230
If state regulation interferes with either of these mechanisms, it 
directly interferes with the policyholders’ insurance incentives to take 
precautions to avoid or limit loss.  An entitlement program for terrorist 
losses increases risk-taking by businesses by decreasing substantially the 
loss they must bear from an attack.  But because the entitlement is not 
conditioned upon proper precautions or risk avoidance, businesses that fail 
to take proper risk management measures are not punished or threatened 
with the loss of the entitlement.  The “premium” paid by a business, if one 
can be identified separately from general taxes, is not linked to a business’s 
particular risk, and does not change in response to the business’s 
management, well or poor, of that risk.  The risk-management incentive 
function of insurance is therefore missing, and much more, compromised.
The compromise is born of the moral hazard often created by 
insurance, which is here made worse by artificially low premiums.  The 
term “moral hazard” is thrown around somewhat loosely to refer to several 
related phenomena.231 Here the term is used to refer to the general 
interference with incentives caused by insurance.  Full insurance, an elusive 
entity, would make a policyholder indifferent to the loss, and therefore 
remove incentives for the policyholder to avoid the loss.  If the 
229
 Another primary mechanism is the use of deductibles or co-insurance payments.  
By requiring the policyholder to continue to bear some of the loss from a risk, the 
policyholder’s moral hazard is decreased.
230
 In many situations, however, it will not be worth the cost to an insurer to hold 
such policyholder-specific premium negotiations, in part because such negotiations 
would ordinarily prove fruitless; policyholders may prefer self-insurance to paying a 
premium close to full loss amount, or may be unable to operate profitably while 
paying the premium.  
231 See Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237 
(1996); and Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical 
Care, 53 Amer. Econ. Rev. 941 (1963).  Confusingly, the insurance industry often 
uses “moral hazard” to refer to incentives to commit insurance fraud.
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policyholder’s laxity cannot be observed by the insurer, the risk the insurer 
bears goes up but the insurer fails to appropriately raise the price (or cancel 
the policy).  
Of greater import here is the negative externality the rest of us bear 
if a business fails to stop or contain a terrorist attack because it has terrorism 
“insurance”.  Two caveats are warranted here.  First, to the extent terrorism 
includes the risk of loss of life, businesses will have a stronger extrafinancial 
incentive to take appropriate precautions with or without insurance.  
Second, moral hazard is always tempered by the extent to which the 
policyholder remains on the risk, through deductibles, caps, and the 
uncertainty of a compliant insurer.  Added to this here is the fact that the 
moral hazard found under TRIA should be compared with another, albeit 
weaker, source of moral hazard; in the absence of mandated terrorism 
insurance, businesses will still assume some amount of government aid after 
an attack.  Therefore, would-be policyholders and actual policyholders will 
both assume some externalization of the terrorism risk.  The point here is 
that moral hazard will be stronger under the TRIA program than without it.
Finally, the potential insurance benefit of “regulatory oversight” by 
an insurer is unlikely to evolve here.  The insurance industry has on 
occasion provided a valuable regulatory function in many areas, both by 
gathering data on events and requiring policyholders to take proven risk-
reduction measures.232  For terrorism insurance to serve a comparative 
advantage over simple government relief, insurers would need to have an 
advantage in the collection of terrorist data or be able to identify those loss 
reduction measures that are feasible, and cost justified.  As for the first, the 
industry cannot compete with the government’s information gathering 
ability or its classified information access.  As the discussion of natural 
disasters confirms, there are times when the government is on the forefront 
of gathering accurate national data because it would be too expensive or 
difficult for any one insurer to do so.
As for the second, with the certain exception of cyberterrorism, it is 
not at all clear that there are loss reduction measures available for the 
protection of most United States property that are not already being 
investigated or taken.  An entire terrorism security industry has arisen.  
Moreover, the government and other owners of high risk properties, such as 
power plants, dams, and electricity vendors, may have sufficient incentives 
232 See John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and The Ironies of Enterprise 
Liability, 103 Colum. L.R. 1, 30-32 (2003) (“[B]y all accounts, boiler insurance and 
the accompanying inspections by trained engineers sharply reduced the incidence of 
boiler explosions.”).
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in the absence of insurance to take appropriate precautions.  Because of the 
public nature of the risk, likely targets are already collaborating with local 
police.  
If insurers had a better idea than others where and how the risk 
would next materialize, terrorism insurance could serve a public function.  
Accurate premium information and proven insurer safety requirements 
could provide incentives, if such information existed.  For now, 
unfortunately, the private insurance market does not provide a benefit the 
government cannot.  Moreover, the government insurance program raises a 
greater threat of moral hazard than does a government post-disaster aid 
program.
B.  PURSUING THE ILLUSION MAY PREEMPT THE REALITY  
TRIA may interfere with the creation of a stronger private insurance 
market for terrorism.  While the risk is not currently meaningfully 
calculable, some insurers have shown an inkling to gamble on non-
catastrophic terrorism risks.  “Many people mistakenly believe insurance is 
akin to gambling.  However, this is not so because gambling creates a risk 
where there was none before, whereas insurance manages an existing risk 
that is unavoidable.”233  While insurers cannot make a meaningful actuarial 
transfer of risk, they can gamble if the market price for gambling strikes 
them as sufficient.
If insurers seem prone to entering the non-catastrophic market, a 
subsidized federal program for both non-catastrophic and catastrophic risks 
could crowd out the purely private insurers.  The term “crowd out” has been
used to describe either the result of insureds switching from private to public 
insurance, or the result of the uninsured choosing public insurance over 
private even after private insurance becomes an option.234  This latter 
description is the potential problem for terrorism coverage.  
Several studies have confirmed the crowding out of private 
insurance by public-assisted insurance programs.  One study empirically 
tested the percentage of crowd-out caused by increases in the Medicaid 
program, using “cross-state and cross-age variation in the size and timing of 
coverage expansions.”235  “As Medicaid eligibility increased, there was a 
233
 Russell, IT’S A DISASTER at 154.
234
 See, e.g., Linda J. Blumberg et al., Did the Medicaid Expansions for Children 
Displace Private insurance?, 19 J. Health Econ. 33, 34 (2000).
235
 David M. Culter & Jonathan Gruber, Does Public Insurance Crowd Out Private 
Insurance?, 111:2 Q. J. Econ. 391, 398 (1996); see also John V. Jacobi, Medicaid 
Expansion, Crowd-Out, and Limits of Incremental Reform, 45 St. Louis U. L.J. 79 
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direct offset in private insurance coverage.”236  The study’s authors 
estimated a crowding out of 30 to 40 percent for children and 50 percent for 
adults, meaning that providing coverage to 100 additional adults caused, or 
correlated, with a decrease in private insurance for 50 adults.237  In another 
study, researchers found evidence that Medicaid “crowds out demand for 
private long-term care insurance” for the elderly.238
Indeed, crowd out is already being alleged for one area of terrorism 
insurance.  
[G]overnment involvement in the sale of airline 
coverage illustrates one of the important potential problems 
with government participation in the insurance market.  At 
least some private insurers are once again willing to supply 
coverage but the airline industry objects that it is too 
expensive. . . . In that event, government becomes the 
problem rather than the solution, crowding out private 
insurance with subsidized public insurance and allowing 
airlines to externalize the risks they create.239
The crowding out of private insurance brings several interrelated 
problems.  The obvious overarching problem is that the public foots a bigger 
bill than would be necessary to provide insurance only to those who could 
not otherwise procure it.  This is the result of an increase in number of 
public insurance policyholders.  This shift away from private insurance 
could make the private insurance market less competitive, or the shrinking 
risk pool could make private insurance more expensive to provide.  The 
potential crowding out of a nascent terrorism insurance market by TRIA is a 
subject unto itself, left for another researcher or at least another day.
CONCLUSION: LIFE AFTER TRIA
Congress passed TRIA having found that “widespread financial 
market uncertainties have arisen following the terrorist attacks of September 
11, 2001, including the absence of information from which financial 
institutions can make statistically valid estimates of the probability and cost 
(2001) (reviewing the research literature and concluding that crowd-out is a 
potentially manageable problem).
236 Id. at 426.
237 Id.
238
 Frank A. Sloan & Edward C. Norton, Adverse Selection, Bequests, Crowding 
Out, and Private Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Long-term Care 
Insurance Market, 15 J. of Risk & Uncertainty 201, 216 (1997).
239
 Gron & Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Market, 36 IND. L. REV. at 458.
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of future terrorist events, and therefore the size, funding, and allocation of 
the risk of loss caused by such acts of terrorism.”240  When TRIA provisions 
sunset at the end of 2004  and 2005, there is little reason to believe that this 
will have changed.  
Before TRIA sunsets, the country may have the misfortune of 
confronting the reality of current terrorism insurance: many losses from 
nuclear, biological, chemical, electrical, Internet, or dirty bomb attacks are 
not insured.  Before adopting another national approach to terrorism 
insurance, the country should confront the fact that the American terrorism 
risk is uninsurable; it is incalculable and prohibitively expensive.  
State mandated terrorism insurance will weaken the insurance 
industry, but fail to provide the desired incentive effects that can make
insurance preferable to an entitlement.  Would it not be better to admit that 
such risks are not insurable, skip the charade of “calculating” and collecting 
premiums for the risk, and permit the public to manage the risk with the 
knowledge that true insurance is not available?  The American people, 
through the government, will pay victims of terrorist attacks in either case.  
The more direct approach to payment will cost less, preserve our insurance 
structure, and open the door for the potential development of a private 
terrorism insurance market.
240
 TRIA § 101(a)(4).
